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We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line
between substance and procedure. But the realization that the terms carry no
monolithic meaning at once appropriate to all the contexts in which courts
have seen fit to employ them need not imply that they can have no meaning
at all. And they are the terms the Enabling Act uses.
-John Hart Ely'
INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom says that the Rules Enabling Act's (REA or
Act) 2 proscription against Rules3 affecting substantive rights is a dead
letter. Commentators on the rulemaking process are fond of pointing
out that the Court has never found a Rule invalid for impermissibly
affecting a substantive right,4 and that the Court, which puts its impri-
matur on the Rules by transmitting them to Congress, rubberstamp
though it may be, is unlikely ever to do so. 5 But conventional wisdom
may be mistaken.
1 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974)
(citation omitted).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
3 A reference to a Rule is a reference to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or
other rule promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
4 See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else
Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 978 (1998); Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The
Constitutional Limits ofJudicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negoti-
ated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 461, 474 & n.78 (1997); Ralph U. Whitten,
Developments in the Erie Doctrine: 1991, 40 AM. J. COMp. L. 967, 970 (1992); Stephen B.
Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in
the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1012, 1041 (1989).
5 See Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTA L. REv. 997, 1006-07 (1983)
("As long as Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. remains law and the Court that promulgates
Federal Rules and amendments has the final word on their validity, disputations re-
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In several recent cases, 6 the Court has signaled its willingness to
take the substantive rights limitation seriously, treating it as a rule of
construction in reading Rules narrowly, so as not to overstep the
bounds of the Court's rulemaking authority. This willingness comes
none too soon, as the issue has increased in practical importance in
the last several years. The Court's own rulemaking process under the
Rules Enabling Act has become increasingly politicized. Several
highly publicized and controversial Rules have been promulgated,
such as the recent amendments to the discovery provisions; equally
controversial proposals, such as proposed amendments to the Rules
governing class actions, have been the subject of much public debate.
Quite naturally, the political debate has spilled over into Congress,
which has responded to the political pressures by circumventing the
rulemaking process and enacting statutes containing procedural pro-
visions favoring certain interest groups.
A central thesis of this Article is that, regardless of whether Con-
gress' increasing role in determining procedural Rules is viewed as
positive or negative, it has profound consequences for the allocation
of procedural rulemaking authority between Congress and the Court.
The broad outlines of that allocation of authority are set out in the
rather Delphic language of the Rules Enabling Act, in which Congress
allocates to the Court the "power to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure,"7 subject to the limitation that "such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."8 Despite the pas-
sage of more than six decades, nieither the Court nor the commenta-
tors have managed to produce a workable definition of the
"substantive rights" limitation.
It may appear, as one commentator has lamented, that the ques-
tion of whether a Rule is "substantive" or "procedural" for purposes of
the Rules Enabling Act is "inherently unresolvable."9 But "they are
the terms the Enabling Act uses,"'1 and the Court, ultimately, must
determine what they mean. This Article is an attempt to aid in that
determination. In doing so, the Article emphasizes that the terms of
garding validity and invalidity are likely to be of purely academic interest.. . .") (cita-
tions omitted).
6 See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500 U.S. 90 (1991); see also Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2248 (1997); Gasperini v. Center for Hu-
manities, Inc., 116 S. CL 2211, 2219 n.7 (1996);.
7 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
8 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
9 Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amend-
ments, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 615, 618 (1997).
10 Ely, supra note 1, at 724.
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the Rules Enabling Act cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be
interpreted in the context of all legislation governing procedure. The
legal effect of the increasing reach of Congress' procedural legisla-
tion, whether a deliberate legislative decision or not, is to expand the
scope of matters that should be considered "substantive" within the
meaning of the REA and, concomitantly, to narrow the scope of the
Court's rulemaking authority. Thus the Court, and Congress, must
pay closer attention to, and be more conscious of, the consequences
of Congress' increased role in procedural rulemaking.
After a brief look in Part I at the politicization of federal proce-
dure, Part II of this Article examines the constitutional allocation of
authority over procedure in federal courts. A careful examination of
interrelated separation of powers and federalism issues is necessary to
provide the constitutional backdrop against which the allocation of
authority in the Rules Enabling Act must be viewed. Congress and the
judicial branch share much of the authority to regulate procedure,
with the courts' procedural common law pronouncements generally
subject to congressional override, other than in a core area necessary
to maintain an independent judiciary. There also are federalism lim-
its on the power of both Congress and the judicial branch to displace
state law with federal procedure, with separation of powers concerns
requiring that Congress play the primary role in determining when
state law will be displaced. In Part III, this Article examines the alloca-
tion of rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act against the
constitutional backdrop, and explores the meaning of the restriction
on Rules affecting substantive rights. In that context, the conse-
quences of congressional procedural enactments on the current allo-
cation of rulemaking power under the REA, and on the validity of
Rules promulgated under that Act, are explored. Increasing congres-
sional involvement in enacting procedural provisions impacts on the
scope of "substantive rights" referred to in the REA and, therefore, on
the scope of the Court's authority to promulgate Rules of procedure.
As Congress broadens its statutory reach to matters historically consid-
ered within the purview of the Court, it necessarily narrows the area in
which the Court may exercise its rulemaking authority. The Article
concludes, in Part IV, by proposing a new multifactor analysis for the
Court and the Advisory Committee to use when evaluating the validity,
or permissible scope, of Rules promulgated under the REA. Those
factors take into account the sensitive separation of powers and feder-
alism concerns and include the extent to which Congress has regu-
lated in the procedural area, as well as the extent to which the matter
is one traditionally left to regulation by the states.
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I. BACKGROUND-THE POLM IZATION OF PROCEDURE
Procedure and the rulemaking process have had a high profile in
recent years. Several significant amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have been made, many amid much controversy. The
level of public debate over the mandatory disclosure provisions and
the amendments to the sanctions provisions of Rule 11 in 1993 was
unprecedented." Before the Court's recent decision in Amchem Prod-
ucts v. Windsor,12 proposals to amend Rule 23's class action provisions
generated vigorous debate, much of it centered on the validity of
those proposals under the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution.1
3
But some of the most significant recent changes to procedure in fed-
eral court are not a product of the rulemaking process set out in the
REA, and are not even reflected in the Rules themselves. Rather, the
changes originated in Congress, in the form of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).14
The PSLRA, which has its origin in the Republican "Contract
With America," was a direct result of lobbying efforts by accounting
11 See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform ForFederal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993).
12 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
13 See, e.g., Symposium, Rule 23: Class Actions at the Crossroads, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 406
(1997); George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions,
26 J. LEGAL STU. 521 (1997). Much of the controversy concerned a proposed
amendment to Rule 23(b) (4), which would have permitted class certification for the
purposes of settlement only, "even though the requirements of subdivision (b) (3)
might not be met," and thus overrule the Third Circuit's ruling in Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Amchem Products Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). See Proposed Amendment to Fed. R- Civ. P. 23(b);
INS v. Yang, 117 S. Ct. 350, 352-59 (1996). That proposal, which was sent back to the
Advisory Committee by the Standing Committee after the period for public comment,
was not sent forward again by the Advisory Committee, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Amchem. The issue has been referred by the Advisory Committee
to its Mass Torts Working Group. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules 41-42 (Dec. 8, 1997). For a more recent discussion of the Amchem case and its
impact on the proposals to amend Rule 23, see Note, The Rules Enabling Act and the
Limits of Rule 23, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2294, 2305-10 (1998).
14 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). The Act became law on December
22, 1995, when the Senate overrode a presidential veto. 141 CONG. REC. S19,180
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). The House had voted to override two days earlier. 141
CONG Ruc. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). The president's veto message can
be found at 141 CONG. REC. H15,214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
On the background to the Act, see generally, John W. Avery, Securities Litigation
Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996); Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38
ARIz. L. REV. 717 (1996).
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firms, securities firms, and the high-tech industry,15 which perceived
themselves as victimized by abusive securities lawsuits. 16 At its core is a
"safe harbor" provision, which insulates issuers from liability for for-
ward-looking statements when they are accompanied by "meaningful
cautionary statements."17 The PSLRA also replaces joint and several
liability with proportional liability18 or imposes a new damages ceiling
15 See Avery, supra note 14, at 339-54; Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for
Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1018-25 (1996);
Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours,
39 Ariz. L. REV. 641 (1997).
16 Whether and to what extent such abuse occurred was hotly debated. At a Sen-
ate hearing on the issue, Subcommittee Chairman Dodd noted that "we found no
agreement on whether there is in fact a problem." Private Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1-3 (1993). See alsoJoel Seligman,
The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARv. L. REV.
438 (1994) (arguing that evidence was insufficient to justify increased burdens on
securities litigation). CompareJanet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (reporting a study
from which she concludes that the settlement value of litigation is not affected by its
merits so much as by the nuisance value of the lawsuit once commenced).
17 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 102(c) (1). The PSLRA
provides:
[I] n any private action arising under this title that is based on an untrue
statement of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make
the statement not misleading, a person ... shall not be liable with respect to
any forward-looking statement, whether written or oral, if and to the extent
that -
(A) the forward-looking statement is -
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the for-
ward-looking statement ....
Id. This provision enacted both a new §27A to the Securities Act of 1933 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)), and a new §21E to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §78u-5).
The safe-harbor provision has been highly criticized for giving issuers a license to
commit fraud. See, e.g., Veto Ovenide Creates Safe Harbor for Fraud, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec.
21, 1995, at B6 (describing the law as providing a "dispensation from truthfulness if
the lies are armored with boilerplate warnings and cautions"). Compare John C. Cof-
fee, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 5 (arguing
that such assessments are "overstatement"); see also Phillips & Miller, supra note 15.
18 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7 8u-4(g) (2) (West 1997) (amending Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 21D).
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in certain cases,'19 and abolishes civil securities fraud as a predicate act
for RICO violations.
20
In addition, and more significantly for the rulemaking process,
the PSLRA contains a set of procedural hurdles to filing and maintain-
ing securities lawsuits in federal courts,21 intended "to tilt the balance
in securities litigation in favor of the defendant at virtually every junc-
ture."22 Each of the procedural provisions in the PSLRA concerns
matters that otherwise are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Specifically, the PSLRA supersedes Rule 9 by providing a
stricter pleading standard for private securities complaints; 23 contains
a provision requiring specific findings as to whether Rule 11 has been
19 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u4(e) (West 1997).
20 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West Supp. 1998) (Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act).
21 Dubbed the "law of unintended consequences" by Joseph Grundfest, the
PSLRA may have simply driven many cases out of federal court and into state courts,
at least for the first year after its enactment. See Walker et al., supra note 15; Panelists
Dispute Reform Law's Impact on Private Class Securities Fraud Litigation, 29 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1134 (1997); Shelene Clark, One Year's Experience With Reform Reveals Law
May Have Unintended Results, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 386, 386-88 (1997) (citing
study by Joseph A. Grundfest, which can be located on the Internet at <http://securi-
ties.stanford.edu>). That trend showed some signs of reversing in 1997, with "an in-
crease in the filings in federal court and a slow down in state court." Congress Targets
"Loophole" in 1995 Act Barring Vexatious Suits, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1211, 1212
(1997) (quoting Professor Grundfest). See also SEC Finds Number of Class Actions Rose in
1997 to Pre-Reform Leve4 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 275 (1998). Nevertheless, con-
troversial bills recently introduced in the House would preempt state law, and give
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over private securities class actions involving na-
tionally traded securities. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997,
H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. Another bill would require all securities fraud suits, not just
class actions, involving nationally traded securities, to be commenced in federal court.
Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1998). A bill
similar to but with a slightly narrower scope than H.R. 1689 was introduced in the
Senate on October 7, 1997. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
S. 1260, 105th Cong.; see also Gramm, Domenici, Dodd Introduce Bill to Federalize Securities
Class Actions, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1401 (1997). The Senate passed S. 1260
on May 13, 1998. On July 22, 1998, it was amended on the House floor by inserting
the text of H. 1689, passed by the House, and sent to the Senate for concurrence.
The Senate did not concur, and the bill was sent to Conference Committee on Sep-
tember 16, 1998.
22 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAw. 975, 995 (1996).
23 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (1), (2) (West 1997) (amending Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881); see infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text; see
also Coffee, supra note 22, at 977-85 (circuits had been split on pleading require-
ments normally required by Rule 9).
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satisfied and providing mandatory sanctions for violations;24 provides
for a stay of discovery while a dispositive motion is pending, obviating
the need for a motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c); 25 and
contains provisions reforming securities class actions, including a pro-
vision under which the court will normally appoint as lead plaintiff the
plaintiff with the greatest financial interest, a much different standard
from that provided in Rule 23.26 Much of the extensive commentary
on the PSLRA is devoted to examining its impact on securities law and
litigation.27 But because Congress has bypassed the normal rulemak-
ing process to create a subset of substance-specific procedural rules,
the PSLRA also has broad implications for the allocation of authority
in civil rulemaking.
28
That Congress responded to lobbying by interest groups and took
on the job of regulating procedure in securities lawsuits came as no
surprise to observers of Rules reform, many of whom for years have
noted, with varying levels of alarm, the increasing politicization of pro-
cedural rulemaking. 29 When Congress gave the Supreme Court su-
24 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (c) (2) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 27(c)); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(c) (2) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 27(b)). Note that the revisions to Rule 11 in 1993 were intended to get rid of
mandatory monetary sanctions.
25 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (adding § 27(b) to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1933); 15 U.S.C.A. 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (adding § 21(D) (b) (3) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
26 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 27(a)); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a)(3) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 21D). Rule 23 provides, inter alia, that the representative parties must "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."
27 See, e.g., Symposium on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus.
LAW. 975 (1996).
28 The significance of the PSLRA for the rulemaking process has not gone unno-
ticed. See e.g. John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf 39 ARiz. L. REv. 453
(1997). At the 1996 AALS convention's Civil Procedure meeting, Professor Stephen
Burbank warned that the Act should sound a "fire alarm" for those involved in the
procedure-making process. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 513, 516 (1996).
29 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded As-
sertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 2067 (1989);Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court:
A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and
Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761 (1993); Linda S.
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemak-
ing, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991). Professor Burbank sees Congress' increasing role in
the rulemaking process as a natural and predictable reaction by Congress to a proce-
dural "power grab by the judiciary," which for years has failed to respect the allocation
of power in the Rules Enabling Act. Burbank, supra note 28, at 513.
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pervisory rulemaking authority in the 1934 Rules Enabling Act, 0 it
was generally thought that a neutral set of uniform Federal Rules of
procedure could best be drafted by the judiciary, as the judiciary was
less subject to political pressures than the legislature. In addition,
Congress was thought not to have sufficient experience or interest in
such an arcane and technical matter.3' The Court was to take care of
the technical matter of procedure, and Congress could focus its atten-
tion on the more important policy issues of substantive law.3 2
This allocation of authority was set out in the REA: the Supreme
Court was delegated authority "to prescribe by general rules . . .the
practice and procedure in civil actions,"33 subject to the proviso that
"[s]aid rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant."3 4 For the first thirty-five years, Congress stayed
out of the rulemaking process and acquiesced in all the proposed
Rules transmitted to it by the Court. 5 But in 1973, when the Advisory
Committee and Court proposed Rules of evidence defining privileges,
Congress stepped in to rewrite them, out of concern both that the
proposed Rules were too substantive to be promulgated by the
Court3 6 and that the Rules, which displaced state laws on privilege,
violated the federalism principles set out in Erie.37 From that point,
Congress began to increase its oversight of the Rules amending pro-
cess by disapproving, delaying, or rewriting proposed amendments to
the Rules.
38
30 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-74 (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (establishing the
Judicial Conference).
31 See Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 601-03
(1926).
32 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015 (1982).
33 Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
34 Id.
35 See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRAMCE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1001 (2d ed. 1987).
36 See Paul D. Carrington, Learning From the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994).
37 See, e.g., ArthurJ. Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Rules of Evidence, 5
SETON HALL L. REv. 667 (1974).
38 The statutes by which Congress had, to that point, affected Rules of Evidence
and of Civil Procedure are listed in a 1985 House Committee Report accompanying a
precursor bill to the 1988 statute amending the Rules Enabling Act. See H.R. REP. No.
99422, at 8-9 n.20 (1985) (technical and typographical errors in the report were cor-
rected at 132 CONG. REC. E177-202 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986)). For a thorough analysis
of the statutes and their implications for the rulemaking process, see Karen Nelson
Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1053-61 (1993) (noting that "Congress' involvement in the pro-
1998]
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In response to growing concerns that many of the Rules' amend-
ments emanating from the Advisory Committee were too substantive
to comply with the requirement that Rules not affect substantive
rights, and concerns that the rulemaking process was too secretive and
undemocratic,39 Congress revised the 1934 Rules Enabling Act.40 The
1988 amendments to the Act provided for greater public access to the
ruminations of the Judicial Conference Rules committees, and greater
congressional oversight of the rulemaking process. A few years later,
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) 41 was enacted, requiring
federal district courts, after consultation with local advisory groups, to
adopt procedural plans to reduce expense and delay in their litigation
dockets, despite objections from the Judicial Conference that the is-
sue should be dealt with by the rulemaking process under the REA.
42
The intense lobbying efforts in Congress against the 1993 amend-
ments to the discovery provisions, particularly the mandatory disclo-
sure requirements of Rule 26, demonstrated the extent to which the
rulemaking process was politicized by these events. 43 The new provi-
sions generated a level of debate unprecedented for proposed Rules
amendments as they worked their way through the Advisory Commit-
tee and to the Supreme Court for transmission to Congress.44 Even
the Supreme Court got caught up in the debate. In transmitting the
proposed Rules to Congress, the Court disavowed having made any
cess of amending Rules has been troubling," because of the disregard for the
rulemaking process established by the Rules Enabling Act and, in at least one instance
involving an amendment to Rule 35, was "a political response to the pressures of a
discrete interest group rather than a carefully crafted response to procedural inade-
quacies of the prior Rule." Id. at 1057). See also Carrington, supra note 36, at 300
(noting in addition that "[i]n 1983, a proposal to amend Rule 4 was modified by
Congress as a result of lobbying efforts of the National Association of Process
Servers").
39 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 36, at 300; Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost,
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165 (1996).
40 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-74 (1988).
41 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994).
42 See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507
(1992); Carl Tobias, CivilJustice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1393 (1992); Edwin J. Wesely, The Civil Justice Reform Act; The Rules En-
abling Act; The Amended Rules of Federal Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 83-What Trumps
What?, 154 F.R.D. 563 (1994). For an argument that the CJRA did not authorize local
rules inconsistent with the FRCP, see Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447 (1994).
43 See generally Carrington, supra note 36; Mullenix, supra note 29.
44 See Carrington, supra note 36; Walker, supra note 11.
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judgment as to their wisdom, stating that "[t]his transmittal does not
necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these
amendments in the form submitted."45 And, in a highly unusual
move, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Souter, vigorously
dissented from the transmission of the Rules amendments, particu-
larly the mandatory disclosure requirements, which he described as
"potentially disastrous. '46 Justice Scalia's criticisms became a rallying
point for opponents of the new Rules who, having failed to dissuade
the Judicial Conference and Court to abandon the amendments,
turned their attention to Congress. There, naturally, political pres-
sures proved far more effective.47 A bill to eliminate the mandatory
disclosure provisions was quickly passed by the House, and failed to be
enacted into law only because the Senate adjourned before an agree-
ment could be reached about what to do with the related presumptive
limits on discovery.48 The brouhaha over the discovery provisions had
45 Order of April 22, 1993, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 403 (1993) (letter from ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist
to Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley, Apr. 22, 1993).
46 Order of April 22, 1993, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
507 U.S. 1091, 1099-1101 (1993) (ScaliaJ., with Thomas and SouterJJ., dissenting)
("The proposed radical reforms to the discovery process are potentially disastrous and
certainly premature-particularly the imposition on litigants of a continuing duty to
disclose to opposing counsel, without awaiting any request, various information 'rele-
vant to disputed facts alleged with particularity.'")
47 Professor Mullenix predicted this turn of events several years earlier:
[T]he inevitable politicization of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee fore-
shadows the decline of that body's role in procedural rule-drafting. The par-
tisan rule reformers will realize quickly that the Advisory Committee, by its
nature, is an ineffectual forum in which to lobby for rule reform. Not only is
the Advisory Committee painfully slow deliberative and dull, but its Article
IIIjudges have little incentive to bend to political will. Hence, the partisan
rule reformers eventually will abandon the Advisory Committee and take
their causes to other rulemaking bodies, namely the congressional commit-
tees with federal rulemaking oversight.
Mullenix, supra note 29, at 801-02 (footnotes omitted). See also Paul Carrington, The
New Order inJudicial Rulemaking, 75JuDicAruE 161, 165-66 (1991) (predicting as the
Reporter for the Advisory Committee that "[i]f Congress is responsive, as is its wont,
to every faction in the United States that detects a possible stake in a proposed
amendment to the rules, the rulemaking tradition is doomed to disintegrate");
Walker, supra note 11, at 460-63.
48 The Civil Rules Amendment Act of 1993, H.R. 2814, 103rd Cong., which would
have deleted the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a) (1), was passed by the
House and sent to the Senate in November of 1993. However, that Rule was part of a
package of discovery amendments, which also included caps on the number of inter-
rogatories and depositions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)2(A); 31(a) (2) (A); 33(a). These
caps were intended to encourage the use of mandatory disclosure. While lobbyists
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barely died down when Congress once again entered the rulemaking
arena, by amending the evidence Rules to provide for limits on the
admissibility of evidence concerning the history of victims of sexual
assault. 4
9
While the politicization of procedure may not be desirable, it cer-
tainly was predictable. As we have seen, when the Court was given
authority to promulgate Rules of procedure, it was subject to the pro-
viso that the Rules not modify substantive rights, which were to be
affected only by legislative action. But the line between substance and
procedure is fluid, and observers of the Rules became increasingly
and senators generally agreed that Rule 26(a) (1) should be deleted, they could not
agree on what to do with the caps on formal discovery, or on whether Congress
should simply delay the provisions to give itself more time to consider the issue. The
bill was delayed and did not come to a vote before the Senate recessed. See Leslie M.
Kelleher, The December 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-A Critical
Analysis, 12 ToURo L. REv. 7, 9-10 (1995); Michael Wagner, Too Much, Too Costly, Too
Soon? The Automatic Disclosure Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 29
TORT & INS. LJ. 468 (1994); Carrington, supra note 36, at 308-10.
After the 1993 amendments came into effect, enthusiasm for the fight against the
mandatory disclosure provisions waned, but a bill was introduced to repeal the
equally controversial amendments to Rule 11. See Attorney Accountability Act of
1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. The bill did not become law. For a description of this
and related bills, see Edward D. Cavanagh, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The Case Against Turning Back the Clock, 162 F.R.D. 383 (1995); Carl Tobias, Common
Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1995); Carl Tobias, Why Congress
Should Reject Revision of Rule 11, 160 F.R.D. 275 (1995). As already noted, mandatory
sanctions are imposed in some securities suits under the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78u-4(c) (1), (2) (West Supp. 1996); see also Simon DeBartolo Group L.P. v. Rich-
ard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A more recent bill, the
Prisoners Frivolous Lawsuit Prevention Act of 1997, H.R. 1492, 105th Cong., is pend-
ing. It would require the imposition of sanctions on parties and attorneys who violate
Rule I1(b) in prisoner suits, and would eliminate the Rule 11(c) (2) limits on sanc-
tions in such suits. On another front, the court reporters' lobby has managed to have
a bill introduced into the Senate which, if passed, would repeal the 1993 amendments
to Rule 30 and restore the preference for traditional stenographic, as opposed to
videotaped, depositions. See S. 1352, 105th Cong. (1997).
On June 19, 1998, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
approved for publication and public comment amendments to the mandatory disclo-
sure provisions proposed by the Advisory Committee. Rule 26(a) (1) would be
amended to preclude local opting out of initial disclosure, but limit the disclosure of
witnesses and documents to supporting information. The proposed amendments also
would exempt certain types of proceedings from disclosure and permit a party who
feels disclosure is inappropriate in the circumstances of the action to object to the
court. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 26, available at <http://wmv. uscourts.gov>.
49 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (amending Federal Rules of Evidence
by adding Rules 413-15).
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likely to perceive their substantive impact.50 Pleading requirements
are a good example. Pleading is quintessentially procedural; as one
procedural scholar has said, "if [pleading requirements are] not pro-
cedure it is hard to know what is."5' 1 A primary goal of uniform Fed-
eral Rules was to "end the battles over pleading that had characterized
much of the common law period and... continued under the Field
Codes. ' 52 Indeed, the 1934 Rules Enabling Act specifically mentioned
writs and pleading in its grant of authority to the Court.53 But the
impact of relaxed pleading requirements on substantive outcomes is
apparent. The Supreme Court has held that state courts cannot apply
strict local rules of pleading to "impose unnecessary burdens upon
rights of recovery authorized by federal laws,"54 and that lower federal
courts cannot impose heightened particularity requirements in plead-
ing to reduce the number of civil rights lawsuits.55
50 Professor Carrington, at that time the Reporter to the Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, made the point as follows:
Those few who observe judicial rulemaking are far more likely today to see
social and economic consequences in what the Committee does than were
earlier generations of observers. The substance-procedure line was never
clear, and was never constant in its application to different contexts; but it
also may be that its meaning has changed over the years, with more matters
being perceived to be substantive than may once have been true.
Reporter, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Committee re: Questions About the
Rulemaking Process (October 18, 1989), at 13-14, quoted in Mullenix, supra note 29,
at 835-36.
51 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 291 (5th ed. 1994) (discuss-
ing Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (holding that state court hearing
a federal FELA claim could not apply strict state rule that complaints must be strongly
construed against pleader, as to do so would impose a burden on the right to recovery
provided by federal law)).
52 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REv. 631, 648. See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHU R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE Cmvn 2d §1202 (2d ed.1990) (discussing the differ-
ences between common law pleading, code pleading, and notice pleading).
53 See Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 415, 48 Stat. 1064.
54 Brown, 338 U.S. at 298.
55 See Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting a
heightened pleading standard for "complaints alleging municipal liability under
§1983," and noting that a heightened pleading standard is "[I] mpossible to square...
with the liberal system of 'notice pleading' established by the plain language of Rule 8
and the ruling in Conley v. Gibson that Rule 8 meant what it said."). But see IA MATrIN
A. ScinvARTrz &JOHN E. KnULrN, SECTION 1983 LmGArON: CLAIMS AND DEFENSEs 21
(1997) (arguing that Leatherman left open the issue of whether a heightened plead-
ing requirement could be imposed for § 1983 claims in which a qualified immunity
defense is available, "on the ground that a factually detailed complaint is necessary to
vindicate the official's immunity from suit"). On pleading requirements generally,
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The importance of pleading requirements did not go unrecog-
nized by repeat players in securities litigation. Prior to the passage of
the PSLRA, a complaint was more difficult to defend in the Second
Circuit than elsewhere against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim because of the Second Circuit's more stringent interpretation of
Rule 9 (b)'s requirement that fraud be plead with particularity.56 Par-
tisan rule reformers recognized the importance of a particularity re-
quirement to the outcome of a case and bypassed the Advisory
Committee completely, taking their proposals for procedural amend-
ments directly to Congress. The strict pleading requirement of the
PSLRA, which Congress intended to be even more stringent than the
former Second Circuit standard,57 is designed to favor defendants
over plaintiffs in securities lawsuits, not to implement some carefully
planned vision of the procedural system. It became one of the most
hotly debated provisions of the PSLRA prior to its passage, and was
one of the reasons cited by President Clinton in vetoing the
legislation.5
8
see Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
56 Compare Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1978) (dismissing complaint
for failing to comply with particularity requirements of Rule 9(b)) with Denny v. Ca-
rey, 72 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding that similar complaint, involving same
plaintiff represented by the same counsel, and naming the same accounting firm as a
defendant, was sufficiently particular to withstand motion to dismiss). See generally
Coffee, supra note 22, at 978-79; John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualifi-
cation and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 Bus. LAW. 1101, 1108-09 (1996).
57 See Coffee, supa note 22, at 979-80 (noting that the Statement of Managers,
which is the legislative history of the Conference Report, states that Congress desired
a stricter rule than the Second Circuit's, but pointing out that the legislative history
does not indicate what the new, stricter standard was intended to be). Several cases
interpreting the PSLRA have rejected the former Second Circuit standard in favor of
a more strict pleading requirement. See, e.g., Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F.
Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). Other courts have continued to find sufficient a showing of "motive
and opportunity" to defraud, or "circumstantial evidence of recklessness." See, e.g., In
re Health Management, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1997); Shahzad v.
Meyers, No. 95 Civ. 6196 (DAB), 1997 WL 47817 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997); Rehm v.
Eagle Finance Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997). See generally DennisJ. Block
&Jonathan M. Hoff, Scienter Requirements Under Securities Litigation Reform, N.Y.LJ.,July
17, 1997, at 5 (analyzing cases). See alsoJames Hamilton, Securities Litigation Reform Act
at Eighteen Months, 1780 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9,11 (Aug. 27, 1997).
58 In his veto message, the President indicated that while he found the pleading
standard adopted in the Second Circuit acceptable, any stricter standard was not. See
141 Cong. Rec. H15, 214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). See generally Coffee, sup-a note
22, at 977-85.
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The implications of congressional tinkering with procedure in se-
curities cases extends far beyond securities law and litigation. The
PSLRA is a clear illustration of the latest stage in the politicization of
procedure. With the PSLRA, Congress has gone further than ever in
providing procedural benefits to a particular group in order to vindi-
cate the substantive goals of the Act.59 As Congress and partisan lob-
byists have discovered the usefulness of procedural provisions in
effectuating substantive purposes, the hazy line between substance
and procedure has been blurred further, and we should expect to see
even more instances of statutory procedural provisions. This certainly
defeats one of the purposes of the Rules Enabling Act, which was to
"alleviate . . .the necessity of searching in two places, namely in the
Acts of Congress and in the rules of the courts, for procedural prereq-
uisites. '60 And it virtually eliminates any possibility of approaching a
procedural system that is truly neutral. Whether a neutral procedural
system even is possible is the subject of much debate,61 but neutrality
among litigants is more likely whenjudges, and not partisan lobbyists,
determine the Rules of procedure.62 Ominously, some commentators
have warned that the increasing congressional role in regulating pro-
59 For other instances in which Congressional enactments have provided proce-
dural advantages to particular groups, see generally Carl-Tobias, The Transformation of
Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1502-04 (1992). On legislation con-
cerning class actions, see Jack Greenburg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of
Obtaining Substance, 39 Aiuz. L. REv. 575 (1997); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at
454 ("We are witnessing the decline of a single, transsubstantive system of civil proce-
dure where class actions are concerned. Legislators have, in effect, amended Rule 23,
not across the board, but in specified substantive areas, and for substantive reasons.").
60 United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098, 1104 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV., 80TH CONG., 2D SEss., 5 LEGISLATIwE HISTORY OF TITLE 28 at 1895,
1896 (1948)).
61 See, e.g., Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
1938-1988, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1873 (1989).
62 SeeJack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to
the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure, 69 CAL. L. REv. 806, 814-15 (1981) (arguing that it is
"far better to leave procedural reform in the hands of the Supreme Court and its
advisory committees, whose members are chosen for their dedication to the improve-
ment of the judicial process, than to rely on elected politicians who must satisfy many
constituents on a variety of issues"). But seeJonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences,
Public Choices, and the Rules of Procedure, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (arguing that, in
making and applying procedural rules, judges are influenced by their own interests,
including their appetites for power, prestige, and leisure time, and that those interests
sometimes may be contrary to the public interest). See alsoJanet Cooper Alexander,
Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647
(1994).
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cedure may signal the demise of the current rulemaking process.63
Certainly, the politicization of procedure has sparked a vigorous de-
bate on whether and how the current system should be reformed.
64
But any reform, however desirable, will not happen overnight. In the
meantime, it is important to have a clear understanding of the present
system, and the allocation of rulemaking authority, in order to assess
the validity, or scope, of Rules promulgated by the Court.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF AuTHORITY TO REGULATE
FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURE
Before exploring the Rules Enabling Act's delegation to the
Court of authority to promulgate Rules of procedure, it is helpful to
examine closely the constitutional allocation of authority to regulate
procedure in federal courts, which is the backdrop for that delega-
tion. Separation of powers and federalism concerns bearing on the
allocation of authority will be examined in turn.
A. Separation of Powers Concerns-Authority of Congress and the Courts
1. The Inherent Authority of the Judicial Branch
The Supreme Court has long accepted that Congress has consti-
tutional authority to regulate practice and procedure in the federal
courts, derived from the grant in Articles I and III of the power to
create lower federal courts coupled with the power to make laws "nec-
essary and proper" for the execution of that power. 65 The questions
63 See Carrington, supra note 47, at 165-66 (predicting that "if Congress is re-
sponsive, as is its wont, to every faction in the United States that detects a possible
stake in a proposed amendment to the rules, the rulemaking tradition is doomed to
disintegrate"); Mullenix, supra note 29, at 802 (predicting that because of Congres-
sional meddling, the Advisory Committee may "go the way of the French
Aristocracy").
64 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BRooy. L. REV. 841 (1993) (urging that rulemakers obtain empirical
evidence on the operation of present and proposed rules before amendments are
promulgated); Carrington, supra note 47, at 166 (suggesting that a group be formed
to lobby Congress to approve the amendments proposed by the Advisory Committee);
Geyh, supra note 39 (proposing the creation of a commission designed to facilitate
exchange of information among the branches of government); Walker, supra note 11
(arguing for a decrease in the discretion of the Advisory Committee via a Supreme
Court order establishing general requirements for review and analysis of the systemic
impact of amendments).
65 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish"); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("The Congress shall
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of what, if any, inherent authority the judicial branch has to regulate
procedure and whether that inherent authority includes authority to
promulgate procedural Rules in the absence of a congressional dele-
gation has not been so clearly decided. These issues sparked a lively
debate before enactment of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act. Several
commentators argued that the courts had inherent authority to regu-
late procedure by court rule, 66 with one commentator maintaining
that the authority to regulate practice and procedure is inherently
and exclusively part of the judicial power, and can be exercised even
in the face of conflicting legislative enactments. 67 Other commenta-
tors argued that, whatever inherent authority courts possess, it does
not include rulemaking authority, and a delegation of authority from
Congress was necessary. 68 The latter view seemed to have had great
have Power... To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States"). Inter-
preting these provisions, the Supreme Court has said that:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make
rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn
includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncer-
tain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classifi-
cation as either.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). See also Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835);
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1 (1825); Bank of United States v. Halstead,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 51 (1825).
66 See, e.g., Pound, supra note 31. See generally Burbank, supra note 32, at 1116
(gathering articles, and commenting that those arguing in favor of the inherent
power of the court to regulate procedure by court rules often "ignor[e] distinctions
between local and supervisory rules of court and between rules of court promulgated
in a legislative vacuum and rules of court contravening statutes").
67 SeeJohn H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules forJudiciary Procedure Are Void Constitu-
tionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). For a more recent example of a similar argument,
see Linda Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separa-
tion of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993); Linda Mullenix, Judicial Power and the
Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERcER L. REv. 733 (1995) (arguing that separation of powers
concerns and the requirement of an independent judiciary mandate that procedural
rules be promulgated by the courts, rather than Congress).
68 SeeJACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURE 177 n.231
(1977); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 35, § 1001 (collecting cites); see also William
W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of
the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAw &
CoNrrwMP. PROBs., Spring 1976, at 102, 107 (contending that the "[necessary and
proper] clause assigns to Congress alone the responsibility to say by law what addi-
tional authority, if any, the executive and the courts are to have beyond that core of
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currency, and it appears that "doubts about the courts' inherent pow-
ers to enact simple rules of procedure led [then Supreme Court]
Chief Justice Hughes . . . to seek a formal delegation from Con-
gress. '69 Article III's provision that the judicial power be vested in the
judicial branch mandates some level of inherent judicial authority
over procedure in the courts. If Congress were to create the lower
federal courts and define their subject matter jurisdiction, but make
no provision for procedure, the courts, in order to function as courts,
would have to adjudicate procedural issues on a case-by-case basis.
70
In several cases, the Supreme Court has noted the existence of the
courts' inherent authority to make "procedural common law" pro-
nouncements. 7 1 This federal "procedural common law' 72 differs
from substantive federal common law in that it operates only in fed-
eral court, and does not bind state courts.73 Furthermore, as dis-
powers that are indispensable, rather than merely appropriate, or helpful, to the per-
formance of their express duties under articles II and III of the Constitution").
69 WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 177 n.231 (citing P.G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 62-65 (1973) and Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of
Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116,
1120-21 (1934)).
70 See Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restriction on Judicial Rulemaking: A
Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 56-57 (1988).
71 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (noting there are "mat-
ters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an area in which federal
courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the
powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules [enactment process]") (quoting
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)); Chambers
v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (finding trial court has inherent power to issue sanctions
on a party for litigating in bad faith); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,
765 (1980) (recognizing that "in narrowly defined circumstances federal courts have
inherent power to assess attorney's fees against counsel"); Landis v. North Am. Co.,
299 U.S. 248 (1936) (holding court has inherent power to control docket, including
power to stay proceedings in one suit pending determination of another suit); Ex parte
Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530-31 (1824) (finding that the trial court has inherent
power to regulate the conduct of lawyers).
72 Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper cite remittitur practice as an example of
what they refer to as "'federal common law of procedure'-that is, judge-made rules
of practice and procedure". 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICrION 2D § 4505 n.61 (2d ed. 1996) (citing cases).
73 Substantive federal common law is binding on state courts under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See id § 4514 (citing inter alia, Free v. Bland,
369 U.S. 663 (1962)). A federal procedural rule, by contrast, normally will not be
applied by a state court, even in a matter as to which federal law controls the substan-
tive outcome. In some such matters, however, the federal procedural rule will be
considered part of the substantive federal law, and thus binding on state courts. See,
e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngston R.R.
Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
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cussed below,74 while substantive federal common law always
preempts state law, federal procedural common law will displace state
law in diversity cases only when there is a sufficiently strong federal
interest in the procedural principle, such as the federal allocation of
functions between judge and jury.
75
The Court has never fully explored the limits of the courts' inher-
ent authority.76 It is clear that, just as substantive federal common law
rules are subject to congressional control or override,7 7 so too is a
large part of the judiciary's inherent authority to regulate procedure
subject to congressional control or override. 78 That congressional
override may be in the form of statutes or Court-promulgated Rules
pursuant to delegated authority under the Rules Enabling Act.79 The
Court has also recognized, however, that although the courts' inher-
ent authority generally is subject to control by Congress, some part of
that inherent authority is absolute, immune from intrusion by Con-
gress.8 0 Thus, for example, Congress may not materially impair the
74 See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
75 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
76 See Burbank, supra note 32, at 1115-16.
77 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the
1972 amendments to federal statutes governing water pollution narrowed the scope
of federal common law as defined in the earlier case of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972), and that federal common law was now displaced, and could not be
used to impose more stringent standards than those set out in the amended statute
and relevant regulations); see also 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 72, § 4514. See gener-
ally Henry Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
78 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). As one prominentjurist has observed, "[t] here has never been
a fully compartmentalized separation of powers." WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 53.
79 See, e.g., Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2248 (1997).
[O]f overriding importance, courts must be mindful that the rule as now
composed sets the requirements they are bound to enforce. Federal Rules
take effect after an extensive deliberative process involving many reviewers: a
Rules Advisory Committee, public commenters, the Judicial Conference, this
Court, the Congress.... The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits
judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Con-
gress ordered ....
1d. (emphasis added). Cf Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (finding that
"[ilt is true that the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can be
limited by statute and rule," but no statute or rule displaced the courts' inherent pow-
ers to sanction) (emphasis added).
80 See Chambers, 501 U.S. 32 (1991). In Chambers, the Court declined to clarify
the extent to which the judiciary's inherent powers are subject to congressional con-
trol. In that case, the Court declined to adopt a three-tier categorization of inherent
powers suggested by the Third Circuit in Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557
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courts' inherent power to sanction for contempt, as that power is in-
dispensable to the courts' ability to function and to the preservation
of an independent judiciary.
81
The Court's decisions are fairly read as recognizing only an inher-
ent authority in the judicial branch to control procedure in the con-
text of adjudicating particular cases.82 That power to adjudicate and
(3d Cir. 1985), the first tier of which were "irreducible powers derived from Article
III," which were beyond the control of Congress. Id. at 562-63. The Chambers Court
stated "this Court has never so classified the inherent powers, and we have no need to
do so now. . .", as it found in that case no Congressional intent to limit the Court's
inherent power to sanction. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47-48 n.12.
81 See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799 (1987) (citing
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924)) (recognizing that the inher-
ent contempt power of federal courts is subject to regulation by Congress, provided
that such regulation does not completely abrogate that power, nor render it practi-
cally inoperative); see also United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,
33 (1812) (noting that "[c] ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts
ofjustice from the nature of their institution .... To fine for contempt-imprison for
contumacy-inforce [sic] the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and
so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute.. .").
See generally Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 1010, 1022 (1924) (discussing the extent to which Congress may control the
contempt powers of the Court, and noting that "[a] s an incident to their being, courts
must have the authority 'necessary in a strict sense' to enable them to go on with their
work"). Cf Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("[b]ecause
inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised
with restraint and discretion"); see also Brainer v. United States, 691 F.2d 691, 697 (4th
Cir. 1982) ("we assume without deciding that federal courts possess some measure of
administrative independence such that congressional intervention would, at some ex-
treme point, 'pass[] the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power'") (citing U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871)). Consider also the
views of Professors Levin and Amsterdam: "There are spheres of activity so fundamen-
tal and so necessary to a court, so inherent in its very nature as a court, that to divest it
of its absolute command within these spheres is to make meaningless the very phrase
judicial power." A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control OverJudicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1958); and of
Professor Redish: "a specific procedural rule [enacted by Congress] could so interfere
with the courts' performance of the ... adjudicatory process of finding facts.., as to
invade the courts'judicial power' under Article III." Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial
Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 725 (1995).
82 Cf Burbank, supra note 4, at 1004 n.30. Burbank observed that:
[C] ommentators are too quick to find assertions of inherent power [to make
rules] in judicial opinions. Take, for instance, Hecker v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) 123 (1865) ... where the Court stated: "Circuit courts, as well as all
other Federal courts, have authority to make and establish all necessary rules for
the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repug-
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regulate procedure on a case-by-case basis does not necessarily imply
the power to establish general rules of procedure, whether local or
supervisory, which is like a legislative power in that it is essentially pro-
spective.8 3 Indeed, it appears that the Court in Wayman found that
the authority to promulgate rules of procedure derives exclusively
from a congressional delegation of authority.8 4 Nevertheless, several
commentators have concluded that even in the absence of delegation,
the federal courts possess some inherent authority to promulgate pro-
spective rules of procedure,8 5 with one commentator going so far as to
suggest that the Supreme Court may have not only the authority, but a
nant to the laws of the United States." Id. at 128 (emphasis added). The case is
cited for the proposition that the federal courts possess inherent power to
make rules.... But the Court was not asserting any inherent power at all.
Rather, it was, in the italicized language, directly quoting the Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
Id. (citations to articles omitted).
83 For an argument that rulemaking is an essentially legislative function that can-
not be delegated to the Court, posited by a long-time chair of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, and a chief opponent of uniform federal rules, see ThomasJ. Walsh,
Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 6 OR. L. REV. 1 (1926), reprinted in
13 A.B.AJ. 87 (1927). See also Martin H. Redish, Separation ofPowers, JudicialAuthority,
and the Scope of Article HI: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 299, 314-19 (1990) (applying a formalism model of separation of powers to con-
clude that there are serious doubts about the constitutionality of an Article III court
promulgating generalized rules of procedure outside of a case or controversy, even
when Congress has purported to delegate what is, in Redish's view, essentially a legis-
lative power); Redish, supra note 81, at 725; cf. Whitten, supra note 70, at 57 & n.73
(citing WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 4-5):
Rule-making by federal courts represents a reversal of usual adjudicative pat-
terns. In most instances a court acts in controversies based upon particular
facts on a case-by-case basis, leaving subsequent decisions to synthesize gen-
eral substantive and procedural rules. At the level of national rule-making,
the Supreme Court lays down general standards applicable to all future cases
without the aid of individual fact situations and argument. The Court does
not have before it interested parties with a motive for presenting the case
fully, as it does in litigation meeting constitutional justiciability require-
ments. In rule-making the Court makes legislative pronouncements . . . a
departure from the usual instance where congressional legislation is mea-
sured and interpreted by the courts in the light of constitutional and other
requirements.
Id. Unlike Professor Redish, however, Professors Whitten and Weinstein conclude
that separation of powers does not prohibit delegation of rulemaking authority to the
Court. WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, passim (1977).
84 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); see also Van Alstyne,
supra note 68, at 124-25.
85 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers ofFederal Courts, 52 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 24 (1985).
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constitutional responsibility, to promulgate supervisory rules of proce-
dure for district courts.8 6 For present purposes, fortunately, it is not
necessary to resolve definitively the issue of whether the inherent au-
thority of the courts includes a rulemaking power, because Congress
has by statute delegated to the Supreme Court supervisory procedural
rulemaking authority.8
7
2. A Preliminary Look at the Line Between "Substance" and
"Procedure"
At this point, it is not necessary to define precisely the exact
boundaries of "procedure" and "substance," as the meanings of those
terms will vary with the context in which they are used.88 The mean-
ings of the terms "substance" and "procedure" take on greater signifi-
cance in the context of the Rules Enabling Act, and their meanings in
that Act will be discussed below.8 9 Roughly, for conceptual purposes,
"purely" procedural matters are those for which the governing deci-
sion or rule is one concerned with and affecting only the orderly dis-
Since the separation-of-powers principle is concerned only with judicial in-
trusion into lawmaking function of Congress, the promulgation of "house-
keeping" rules that would have no impact on congressional policies is
consistent with the constitutional division of powers .... [F]ederal courts
should be regarded as having inherent authority [subject to congressional
override] to adopt their own provisions regarding the conduct of litigation
and internal operations without violating any principle of separation of
powers.
Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 37, at 669-71 (reviewing historical practice in Eng-
lish courts, and the adoption of those practices in the United States, and concluding
that "[h]istorically, courts have been generally thought to possess certain rule making
powers").
86 See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45
DuKE L.J. 929, 974 (1996) (arguing that federal procedure fashioned entirely by case
law "in the short term would raise an issue whether due process of law requires that
there be some rules of the game announced in advance of the commencement of
play").
87 See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER., supra note 35, at 5 (stating that the debate as to the
nature and scope of the courts' inherent power "really is of no practical importance
with regard to federal practice" because it is assumed that Congress has the constitu-
tional authority to regulate practice and procedure, and has delegated that authority
to the Supreme Court).
88 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) ("'[S]ubstance' and
'procedure' are the same key-word to very different problems. Neither 'substance'
nor 'procedure' represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables de-
pending upon the particular problem for which it is used."). See generally Walter
Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333
(1933).
89 See infra Parts III & IV.
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patch or administration of judicial business, or with "mak[ing] the
process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution
of disputes."90 An example of a purely procedural matter could be a
rule governing the manner in which papers are filed with the court,
such as whether facsimile copies are acceptable or whether electronic
filing is available. 9 ' Such rules have no policy implications; they are
solely for administrative convenience and have minimal impact on the
parties' substantive rights. (Many, of course, would dispute that it is
ever possible to have a "purely" procedural rule, as even the most os-
tensibly innocuous rule, such as a rule governing facsimile submis-
sions, will have some impact on substantive rights and have some
policy implications, in the sense that it will increase or decrease access
to the courts). "Purely" substantive matters, by contrast, are those for
which the governing decision or rule involves policy choices unrelated
to the fairness, efficiency, or administration of the litigation process.
92
Examples are federal law defining securities fraud or state law defin-
ing negligence.
A legal rule can have both procedural and substantive purposes,
and even if the animating policies of a rule ostensibly are procedural,
it may have significant substantive implications, whether intended or
not.93 The area of overlap between substance and procedure, where
matters are "rationally capable of classification as either,' '9 4 is quite
large because, as demonstrated by the prior discussion of rules gov-
erning pleading requirements, most procedural rules have substantive
implications. For another example, limitations peio ds may have pro-
cedural functions or implications, such as helping to ensure that evi-
dence in a case will not be so stale that it is not untrustworthy or
reducing the volume of litigation, and also may have substantive func-
tions or implications, such as promoting diligence by plaintiffs, afford-
ing potential defendants some repose after the period has expired, or
defining, temporally, the right to sue.95 The precise boundaries of
90 Ely, supra note 1, at 724 (citation omitted) (using this phrase to describe "pro-
cedural rules" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act.). See also D. Michael
Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited With Some Afterthoughts on the Constitu-
tional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 189, 204-09 (1982).
91 See, e.g., FED. R. GwV. P. 5.
92 See Ely, supra note 1, at 724 (citation omitted) (describing "substantive rights"
within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act); see also Burbank, supra note 5, at
1019-20. See generally Risinger, supra note 90.
93 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1027-28; see also Risinger, supra note 90.
94 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
95 See generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Stat-
utes of Limitations, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997) (analyzing policies favoring and disfavoring
limitations of actions). See also Risinger, supra note 90, at 209-10.
1998]
70 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:1
purely procedural matters are of little practical significance for a sepa-
ration of powers analysis, as the Court has consistently accepted that,
other than in some undefined area where the Court's authority over
procedure is supreme, such as the core contempt power,96 Congress
has power to regulate not only purely procedural matters in federal
courts but also matters "rationally capable of classification" as proce-
dural or substantive.
97
It should be noted that the inherent authority of the judicial
branch to regulate procedure is not coextensive with Congress', in
that it does not extend to all matters rationally capable of classifica-
tion as procedural. As to some matters that fall in the area where
procedure and substance overlap, separation of powers concerns and
the constitutional structure prohibit a court from regulating them,
even on a case-by-case basis, in the absence of some legislative or con-
stitutional directive. An example of such a matter is the grant of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to the courts, which by the Constitution is left
to Congress, and authority over which cannot be delegated to the
courts.98 Other matters in this area are placed beyond regulation by
either the Court or Congress by virtue of their being guaranteed by
96 See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924).
97 Hanna, 360 U.S. at 472.
98 See Whitten, supra note 70, at 55-56 ("The text of article III... and the com-
promise that produced the language indicates that Congress should decide not only
whether to create inferior federal courts, but also whether, and to what extent, these
courts would supplant the jurisdiction of state courts over national matters ....
[T]here are other matters of court organization and structure that seem so funda-
mental that Congress must determine them itself. Such matters include the number
of lower federal courts, their basic form, and the number ofjudges to sit on the courts
and the qualifications of the judges, and the location of such courts.") (citations
omitted).
See also Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22 (1981) ("The con-
cept of subject-matter jurisdiction in our legal system refers to ... the root power to
adjudicate a specified set of controversies. Ultimately, jurisdiction is an essential part
of what makes a court a court .... From the elemental, legitimating quality ofjuris-
diction it follows that, whatever other powers a court may have to change legal norms,
it cannot generate its own jurisdiction."). The Court does exert some control over
subject matter jurisdiction, when it refuses to exercise jurisdiction conferred on it by
Congress, as with the abstention doctrines. See David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discre-
tion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing for the legitimacy of the abstention doc-
trine). The constitutionality of this "jurisdictional common law" is questioned by
some commentators. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and
the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (arguing that the doctrine of
abstention is unauthorized). See generally Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Poli-
tics-A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 BYU L. REV. 767
(reviewing debate, and proposing a "middle ground").
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the Constitution. Examples include the right to trial by jury and the
right against self-incrimination. 9 The courts, of course, as arbiters of
the meaning of the Constitution,10 0 must define these constitutional
norms, and the definitions may change from time to time; but, in the-
ory at least, the norms are nonetheless generated by the Constitution
and not the courts. Finally, some substantive matters involve policy
choices of such significance that, even though federal courts may de-
termine their scope as a matter of common law in appropriate
cases, 10 1 separation of powers considerations mandate that they be
Professor Whitten, in the article cited above, argues that separation of powers
concerns also remove from the courts' powers matters as to which Congress has occu-
pied the field with regulation. See also LindaJ. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis as a
Method for Determining the Validity of Federal District Courts' Exercise of Local Rulemaking
Power: Application to Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 483, 503-04 (1991) (proposing a separation of powers analysis similar, to Profes-
sor Whitten's to determine when courts may make local rules and when Congress
must do so). Professor Whitten's analysis is not inconsistent with the thesis of this
article, in that he agrees that in the absence of legislation, those matters would be
within the inherent authority of the courts. It is contended in this Article that it is
preferable to characterize the event as a "displacement" or "override" of the proce-
dural common law. It is the contention of this Article also that the Rules Enabling
Act does not purport to delegate to the Court authority to promulgate rules in areas
where Congress has legislated extensively.
99 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (jury trial); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1
(proof of treason); U.S. CONST. amend. V (grand jury and self-incrimination); U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (trial by jury in criminal prosecutions and confrontation of wit-
nesses); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (trial by jury in civil actions).
In addition, many commentators argue, Article III and the constitutional struc-
ture place limits on the power of Congress to control the subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts. The Supreme Court has reasoned that the greater power of
Congress to create or abolish lower federal courts includes the lesser power to control
theirjurisdiction. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 441 (1850). Some commentators argue, however, that Congress' power is
not plenary, and cannot be used to deprive the courts of their "essential functions" of
providing the ultimate determination as to meaning of federal law, and maintaining
the supremacy of federal law. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 98 (arguing that Article III
requires that a federal court be available for a constitutional challenge). But see Mar-
tin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federaljurisdic-
tion: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 143, 157 (1982) ("Congress has
complete authority to have constitutional rights enforced exclusively in the state
courts ... ."). Much of the extensive debate on the issue is collected in RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. -T AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 358-87 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
100 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also AL xANDER M.
BIciEL, THE LEAS DANGEROUS BRANcH 14 (1986) (noting that it has been accepted
for 200 years that the court is the arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution).
101 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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subject to prospective regulation only by a democratically elected leg-
islature, rather than by court-promulgated rule.
102
B. Federalism Concerns-Limitations on the Powers of Congress and the
Federal Courts to Displace State Law with Procedural Provisions
It has been well established since at least 1825 that Congress has
broad power under Article III, in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, to regulate practice and procedure in the federal
courts. 10 3 Until the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, that power was used,
through the Conformity Act,104 to require federal courts to mimic
state court procedure. At the same time, the Rules of Decision Act,
10 5
enacted as part of the First Judiciary Act, required that the federal
courts apply substantive state law in diversity cases as well. In Swft v.
Tyson, x0 6 however, the Court interpreted "laws" as including only stat-
utes and not extending to state common law doctrines, so that federal
courts were able to articulate substantive federal common law princi-
ples in diversity cases if no state statute controlled. In 1938, Justice
Brandeis' decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'07 overruled the Swift
decision, and declared that state decisional law, as well as statutory
law, must be applied in diversity cases. Erie established that neither
Congress nor the federal courts have power to declare the substantive
rules of decision in diversity cases in federal courts:
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in nature or "general,"
be they commercial law or part of the law of torts. And no clause in
the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts.
1 0 8
102 Cf. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (noting that "[t]he
line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must
be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a
general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
general provisions to fill up the details").
103 See id. at 22; Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 655 (1835) ("[T]hat the
power to ordain and establish [federal courts], carries with it the power to describe
and regulate the modes of proceeding in such courts, admits of. . . little doubt.").
104 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Star. 197. The 1872 Conformity Act pro-
vided for "dynamic" conformity; that is, the federal courts were to conform as nearly
as possible to state procedure as it changed. For a summary of authority over federal
court procedure under the prior Process Acts, see 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 545-51 (1971).
105 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
106 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
107 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
108 Id. at 78.
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Erie establishes that Article III gives no power to Congress to de-
termine the substantive rules of decision in diversity cases; Congress
must look to other constitutional powers. Nor may the federal courts
constitutionally decide issues as a matter of federal common law solely
on the basis of the Article III grant of diversity jurisdiction.10 9 In Erie
itself, Congress had undisputed authority under the commerce clause
to enact a law controlling the outcome, as that case involved a railroad
engaged in interstate commerce.110 But as Congress had not exer-
cised its constitutional power either by enacting applicable law or del-
egating common law-making authority to the courts, the Court was
not able to determine the outcome of the case as a matter of federal
common law. Thus, Erie also establishes that there are greater consti-
tutional limits on the federal courts' common law making power than
on the legislative authority of Congress-that the federal courts' com-
mon law making power is not coextensive with Congress' Article I
powers."' While there is still some room for specialized federal com-
mon law, such as when there is a uniquely federal interest involved or
federal common law is required by the constitutional structure,"12 sep-
109 See id.
110 See Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986) (estab-
lishing a federal cause of action for negligence against interstate railroads by their
employees who are injured in the course of their employment). In Mondou v. New
York, N.H. & H.R Co. (In re Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1 (1912),
decided twenty-five years before Erie, the Court held that FELA was a valid exercise of
Congress' power under the commerce clause of Article I. See also NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In NLRB, which was decided the year before
Erie, the Court interpreted the commerce clause as reaching activities that were previ-
ously seen as local and thus beyond Congress' power: "[a]lthough activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied
the power to exercise that control." Id. at 37. See also Donald L. Doemberg, Juridical
Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 759, at nn.17 & 202 and accom-
panying text (gathering contemporary commentary on Erie).
111 As Professor Monaghan has said, "Erie is, fundamentally, a limitation on the
federal court's power to displace state law absent some relevant constitutional or stat-
utory mandate which neither the general language of article III nor the jurisdictional
statute provides." Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Weschler's the Federal Courts and the
Federal System, 87 HAuv. L. REv. 889, 892 (1974) (book review) (citation omitted). See
also Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1682 (1974); LARRY L. TEPLY & RKLPH U. WHITrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 404 (1994).
112 Erie did not hold that there is no place for federal common law. Indeed, in
another opinion by Justice Brandeis issued the same day, the Court announced that
"whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between ... two
States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the
decisions of either State can be conclusive." Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
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aration of powers concerns, as well as the institutional structures of
the federal system, mandate that Congress, not the courts, has the pri-
mary role in deciding whether to displace state law.'1 3 The Erie rule
of requiring federal courts in diversity cases to apply state law, Justice
Brandeis noted, also ensures uniformity of decision between state and
federal courts and prevents discrimination among parties caused by
forum shopping between state and federal courts. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Reed questioned the holding that Congress could not
declare substantive law in diversity cases, pointing out that "the line
between procedural and substantive law is hazy, but no one doubts
federal power over procedure."11 4
Seven years later, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,115 the Court estab-
lished that just as the institutional structure of the Constitution limits
the ability of a federal court to impose federal substantive common
law in a diversity case, it restricts the courts' ability to impose judge-
made federal procedural rules that displace state law. In that case, the
Court held that a federal court was required to apply a state limita-
tions statute, rather than the doctrine of laches, which ordinarily
would have been applied in a federal court, to determine if a claim
was time-barred. In so holding, the Court cited the Erie "policy" of
ensuring "so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,"
that the outcome of litigation in a federal court would be "substan-
tially the same" as it would have been in state court.1 16 For many, the
York decision, along with the Court's 1949 Cohen, 1 7 Woods,118 and
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). However, the proper scope of federal common
law is the subject of much debate. For a discussion of some of the leading commen-
tary on the issue, see HART & WESCHLER, supra note 99, at 752-58.
113 See Mishkin, supra note 111, at 1686 (arguing that the courts are inappropriate
makers of laws intruding upon the states' views of social policy in the areas of social
competence, and noting, in support, that the states and their interests are repre-
sented in Congress, but not in the federal courts); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The
Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REv. 327 (1992); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of
the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992); Doernberg, supra note 110, at 803 (cit-
ing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)) ("[I]t is... the exclusive
province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate pro-
grams and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once
Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a
given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce
them .... ).
114 Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
115 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
116 See id. at 109.
117 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (discussed infra
note 191).
118 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (discussed infra note 192).
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Ragan1 9 trilogy, raised a question as to whether there was any room
for uniform rules of federal procedure, as any procedural rule will
have some impact on the outcome of a case. 120 But in the York deci-
sion itself, the Court recognized that the federal and state systems
were not identical and stated that federal courts might afford reme-
dies not available in state courts.
12 1
The 1958 decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Coqperative'
2 2
demonstrated that federalism had not been taken to the "absurd ex-
treme"' 23 perceived by critics of the York decision, and that there was
some room for displacement of state law by federal judge-made proce-
dural law. There, the Court held that the "outcome-determinative"
test of York was not controlling when there were "affirmative counter-
vailing considerations"'124 favoring the application of federal judge-
made procedural law. In that case, the Court considered whether a
federal court was obligated to follow a state rule relegating to a judge
the determination as to whether the defendant was a statutory em-
ployer, when the federal court normally would have that issue decided
by a jury. If uniformity of outcome were the only consideration, the
Court stated, there might be a strong argument for requiring the fed-
eral court to follow state practice. But in this case the application of
the state rule would undermine the federal allocation of functions be-
tween judge and jury-an essential characteristic of the independent
federal system.125 After carefully weighing the interests in uniform
outcomes against the interests of the independent federal system, the
Court determined that a deviation from the state practice was justi-
fied.1 26 Thus, federal procedural common law may override state law
in an appropriate case.
119 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (discussed
infra note 193).
120 See Edward Lawrence Merrigan, Erie to York to Regan-A Triple Play on the Fed-
eral Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950) and C. WRIHT, THE L-w OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS (5th ed. 1994).
121 See York, 326 U.S. at 106.
122 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
123 Charles E. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights; to a More Perfect
Union, 40 TExAs L. REv. 211, 220 (1961).
124 Byr, 356 U.S. at 537.
125 The Court did not decide whether the result was mandated by the Seventh
Amendment, choosing instead to leave that question open. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
In a subsequent case, Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963), the Court held that the
Seventh Amendment does apply to diversity cases.
126 See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538. The Byrd case does not make clear, however, just
which "affirmative countervailing considerations" will justify departures from state
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In its 1965 decision in Hanna v. Plumer,127 the Court reaffirmed
the principle of Byrd that the outcome determinative test of York "was
never intended to serve as a talisman"'128 in resolving conflicts between
state law and federal procedural law in federal courts.' 29 However,
the Court also reaffirmed York's principle that state law should be fol-
lowed in federal court when the failure to do so would violate the
"twin aims of Erie' 130 by either encouraging forum shopping or result-
ing in an inequitable application of the law. Thus, although not in
such terms, the Court confirmed the strict limits imposed by the fed-
eral constitutional structure on the federal courts' inherent power to
regulate procedure.
At that point, the Court reformulated its approach to cases involv-
ing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The analysis of the Erie line
of cases, the Court held, was not the appropriate test for validity of a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Rather, the validity of a Rule, which
is promulgated pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the
Court in the Rules Enabling Act, is to be adjudged by whether it is
within the scope of the delegated authority, and whether, under the
Constitution, Congress has the authority it purported to delegate to
the Court. In the Court's ruling, there seemed to be virtually no fed-
eralism constraints on Congress' power to regulate procedure in the
federal courts. Congress' broad power to control, the Court stated,
extends to matters that fall in the "uncertain area between substance
and procedure, [but] are rationally capable of classification as
either."' 3 ' By distinguishing procedural matters from substantive,
Hanna seemed to confirm the federalism principle articulated byJus-
tice Brandeis in Erie, leaving substantive matters to the state. But the
very "generous"' 32 interpretation of Congress' authority under Article
III to regulate procedure in federal court means that any federal stat-
ute rationally capable of classification as procedural will displace state
law, regardless of how substantive, and even in diversity cases, where
the claim is state-created. If the Hanna test is taken at face value, Jus-
tice Reed may have been correct in Erie after all; Congress has author-
ity to declare the substantive law in a diversity case, provided that the
law also has some procedural implication, no matter how small or how
practice. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 72, § 4504; TEPLY & WHITrEN, supra
note 111, at 421-24.
127 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
128 Id. at 466-67.
129 See id. (citing Byrd).
130 Id at 468.
131 Id at 472.
132 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 72, § 4505.
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much its procedural characteristic is outweighed by its substantive
implications.
Hanna's "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional"'133 test for con-
gressional power (and, apparently, for the Court's authority under the
Rules Enabling Act 34 ) may not take into sufficient account the inter-
ests, and law-making authority, of the states. Hanna itself was a rela-
tively easy case for the displacement of state law, involving simply, in
the Court's view, the displacement of a procedural state provision for
service of process by the federal service provision.' 3 5 Indeed, the
Court initially analyzed the provision as though it were federal proce-
dural common law, and found that even applying a strict Erie analysis,
displacement of state law was justified.
3 6
The situation presented by the later case of Stewart Organization
v. Ricoh13 7 was more difficult, as the application of the Hanna rule
resulted in the displacement of substantive state contract law by a fed-
eral procedural provision. In Stewart, the plaintiff filed a breach of
contract claim in federal court in Alabama. The defendant moved,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, to transfer the case to a federal district
court in New York, as the contract contained a forum selection clause,
which admittedly would not have been enforced by an Alabama state
court. Were the federal rule one of procedural common law, state law
would not be displaced. And, a Rule promulgated under the REA that
purported to govern would be invalid as violative of the substantive
rights limitation. But the federal law in Stewart was a statute enacted
by Congress under which, the Court found, a forum selection clause
was a factor to be considered in determining whether to grant a trans-
133 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority test
for Congress' Article III power was inconsistent with the allocation of power between
the state and federal systems, in that it permitted a federal rule that could reasonably
be classified as procedural to apply in federal court "no matter how seriously it frus-
trated a State's substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its
citizens").
134 Although the Court in Hanna recognized that the Rules Enabling Act
presented a limit on the rulemaking authority of the Court independent of the con-
stitutional limits on Congress' authority, in other parts of the decision the Court
seemed to conflate the constitutional test with the test for validity under the REA. See
infra text accompanying notes 221-222.
135 The state statute involved in Hanna was also, in part, a statute of limitations.
The Court found, rather dubiously, that part of the statute was not implicated, as the
action clearly was timely commenced. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 n.1.
136 Justice Harlan, who strenuously objected to the broad power afforded Con-
gress by the majority position, agreed with the result in the case, on the grounds that
applying the federal rule would not impinge on the vitality of the state policy served
by the state rule. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., concurring).
137 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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fer. As the statute was one "doubtless capable of classification as a
procedural rule,"1 38 it overrode state contract law, which would have
held a forum selection clause unenforceable and thus irrelevant to a
motion to transfer venue. Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that § 1404
should be read more narrowly, so as not to preempt state law in the
absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to do so and in
keeping with the federal policy, articulated in Erie, of striving for uni-
formity of outcome in federal and state court. He argued that state
law should be applied first to determine the validity of the clause,
which, if invalid, should be given no weight in a motion to change
venue. Some commentators have gone even further than Justice
Scalia and have also criticized the decision for failing to consider the
constitutional limits of Congress' Article III power to control
procedure. 139
At face value, the Hanna and Stewart interpretation of Congress'
Article III powers would permit Congress to override state law in diver-
sity cases with respect to matters such as testimonial privileges, limita-
tions periods, and arbitration, as each of these matters is at least
"rationally... capable of classification" as procedural. 40 Yet each of
these matters also has substantive implications for matters that, in di-
versity cases, are primarily the concern of the states. For example, a
state law granting an immunity from being called to testify against
one's spouse is intended to foster the marital relationship and repre-
sents a decision by the state, whether speaking through the legislature
or court, that encouragement of that relationship "outweighs the
need to have all relevant evidence in determining the truth of a mat-
ter.'' In a case to enforce federal law, or a federal criminal matter,
the federal interest in deciding what evidence should be available for
enforcement of federal law is obvious, and it is not difficult to justify
congressional interference with the state policy of fostering the mari-
tal relationship. But when a suit is in federal court in diversity, the
federal interest in deciding what evidence should be available to en-
138 Id. at 32.
139 See, e.g., Margaret G. Stewart, Political Federalism and Congressional Truth-Telling,
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 511, 536-43 (1993); id. at 538 ("Even assuming that the congres-
sional command to enforce forum selection clauses is clearly expressed, there re-
mains a concern with the source of congressional authority to displace contrary state
law."); see also Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1130
(1989) ("The increasing ease with which the Court invokes Hanna is a danger to
separation of powers and to federalism.").
140 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 72, § 4505.
141 Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L.
REV. 563, 572 (1967) (citing 8 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
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force state law is less compelling. The interference with the in-
dependent administration of the federal system-that is, the impact
on the accuracy of fact-finding-occasioned by the application of a
spousal privilege rule in a diversity case arguably is not sufficient to
justify disregarding a substantive state policy in applying state law.142
As Professor Carrington has stated in another context, some "proce-
dural" rules "arguably have too little bearing on the courthouse con-
duct of federal litigants, and too much bearing on the value of the
substantive rights and defenses created by state law to be mere fea-
tures of federal judicial administration." 143 Just as the constitutional
federal structure places limits on Congress; ability to displace state law
pursuant to Article I powers,'4 and just as Congress may not pursuant
to its Article III powers set the standard for negligence in diversity
cases, 145 Congress may be limited in its ability to affect substantive
state law pursuant to its power to regulate procedure in federal courts
in diversity cases.
142 See Goldberg, supra note 37, at 682 ("[R]ules of privilege are substantive within
the meaning of the Erie doctrine and therefore must yield to state law in diversity
suits.") (collecting authorities); see also Stewart, supra note 139, at 530-34.
Cf. Wright, supra note 141, at 572 (concluding that under the Hanna decision, it
appears that Congress and the Court constitutionally could adopt a federal rule deny-
ing a privilege where the state would grant one, but urging that such a rule not be
adopted, as it would be an indefensible intrusion into state policy). Note that in 28
U.S.C. § 2074(b), Congress has forbidden the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
overriding state privilege rules without congressional approval. This provision could
be read to reflect Congress' belief that it has constitutional authority to promulgate or
approve such provisions if it so desired. Regardless, Congress has not attempted to
exercise such power, apparently out of concern both for the states' interests and be-
cause of the ambiguity as to the constitutional limits of Congress' power. For present
purposes, it is more significant that Congress has made clear it has not delegated any
such authority to the Court, reflecting the belief that the decision to override state law
should be made by Congress, and not the Court. Cf. Mishkin, supra note 111, at 1685
(arguing that the constitutional structure confines that authority to Congress, where
the states and their interests are represented); Rowe, supra note 4, at 982 (arguing
that by § 2072(b), Congress has prohibited Federal Rules that conflict with state laws
reflecting substantive state policy). This Article contends that state legislative policy is
not determinative of the validity of a federal rule.
143 Carrington, supra note 86, at 1001. Professor Carrington concluded that "Con-
gress may lack power to enact a fee-shifting rule designed to induce settlement of all
civil cases in federal courts, and almost certainly lacks the power to enact a fee-shifting
rule fashioned to induce settlement only of diversity cases." Id at 1002.
144 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a statute making
it a federal offense for a person knowingly to possess a firearm within a school zone,
on the grounds it was not a valid use of commerce clause powers).
145 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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That there may be some limits on Congress' authority to displace
state law in federal court with procedural enactments appears to have
been an unspoken assumption of the Court's 1956 decision in Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Company.146 That case, brought to federal court in
diversity, involved an employment contract made in New York be-
tween New York citizens. The plaintiff then became a resident of Ver-
mont, where he was to perform his duties. He was discharged, and
sued in Vermont state court. The defendant employer removed the
case to federal court and then moved to stay the proceedings so that
the matter could be arbitrated in New York pursuant to an arbitration
clause in the contract. The issue was whether the federal Arbitration
Act, which provided that arbitration clauses were enforceable and that
federal court proceedings were to be stayed pending arbitration,
would displace Vermont law, which permitted revocation of the con-
tract at any time before an award was made. The Supreme Court
found that the Arbitration Act did not govern, as it applied only to
maritime contracts or contracts involving interstate commerce, and
the contract in question involved neither. The Court apparently felt
compelled by federalism concerns to read the statute in that manner.
To hold otherwise, the Court stated, might raise a constitutional
question:
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not
have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable
to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases ... § 3 [of the Arbi-
tration Act], so read, would invade the local law field. We therefore
read § 3 narrowly to avoid that issue.
147
146 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
147 Id. at 202. In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated:
I agree with the Court's opinion that the differences between arbitral and
judicial determination of a controversy under a contract sufficiently go to
the merits of the outcome, and not merely because of the contingencies of
different individuals passing on the same question, to make the matter one
of "substance" in the sense relevant for Erie... In view of the ground that
was taken in that case for its decision, it would raise a serious question of
constitutional law whether Congress could subject to arbitration litigation in
the federal courts which is there solely because it is "between Citizens of
different States," . . . in disregard of the law of the State in which a federal
court is sitting.
Id. at 207-08 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Some commentators have criticized the
suggestion in Bernhardt that Congress cannot "invade the field" of "local law." See
Peter Westen &Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. REv. 311, 355 (1980) ("[I]t is a fundamental mistake to think that the consti-
tutional authority of the federal government is limited or demarcated by rigid 'en-
claves' of 'local' law. The only significant constitutional question in any Erie case is
whether the pertinent federal rule falls within one of Congress' enumerated pow-
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Bernhardt, in which the Court averted only to Congress' powers
under Article I,'was decided before the Court in Hanna so clearly ex-
pressed the very broad "rationally capable of classification as proce-
dural" test for Congress' Article III power to override state law in
matters before federal courts. At face value, the Hanna test "would
foreclose the constitutional doubts voiced in the Bernhardt decision,
for arbitration... rationally is capable of classification as procedural
and therefore within federal rulemaking authority for all diversity
cases."148 Just two years after the Hanna decision, in the Prima Paint
case, 149 the Court rejected the opportunity to so hold. That case, like
Bernhardt, was a diversity decision involving the enforceability of an
arbitration clause and an application for stay of proceedings pending
arbitration. This time the underlying contract involved interstate com-
merce, and for that reason, the Court found the federal Arbitration
Act applicable. In addressing the constitutionality of the Act, the
Court relied solely on Congress' Article I powers to regulate interstate
commerce;150 it made no reference to Congress' Article III powers to
ers.") (citing Ely, supra note 1, at 701-02). In Bernhardt, however, the Court read the
Arbitration Act narrowly in order to avoid that precise constitutional question of
whether Article III gives Congress the power to require arbitration in diversity cases.
148 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 72, §4505. See also Freer, supra note 139, at 1128
(arguing that Stewart and Bernhardt are irreconcilable).
149 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). For a
critical discussion of the Bernhardt and Prima Paint decisions, see Westen & Lehman,
supra note 147, at 353-56.
150 Id. at 405:
The question in this case... is not whether Congress may fashion federal
substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity cases. See
Bernhardt... Rather, the question is whether Congress... plainly has power
to legislate. The answer to that can only be in the affirmative. And it is clear
beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and con-
fined to the incontestable federal foundations of "control over interstate
commerce and over admiralty."
(citation omitted). In subsequent cases, the Court ruled that the 1925 federal Arbitra-
tion Act, as an exercise of Congress' Article I powers, preempts state law and applies
to cases in state court involving interstate commerce. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983) ("[S]tate courts, as much as federal
courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration Act."); see
also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The result of this line of cases is that a procedural statute
intended to govern proceedings in federal courts, which was enacted by Congress as
an exercise of its constitutional powers over federal courts, became a statute regulat-
ing interstate commerce. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LANw: REFoRmA-
TION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 169 (1992). For a criticism of the
Court's jurisprudence in the area, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract
and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331, 332 ("[T]he Court has completely federalized
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regulate procedure in federal courts, or to the Hanna decision, as ad-
ditional support for the ruling. Together, the Bernhardt and Prima
Paint cases imply that there may be some matters that, although they
are "rationally capable of classification as procedural" within the
meaning of Hanna, nevertheless are so substantive that Congress can-
not displace state law in the area other than through an exercise of
Article I powers.
151
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that Congress must
always rely on Article I powers to displace state law with rules of proce-
dure in federal courts.152 Nor is it an attempt to delineate the limits
of Congress' Article III power to displace state law. Rather, it is meant
to suggest only that when Article III power alone is relied on, a careful
assessment of the competing interests is required, and to point out
that there is greater uncertainty as to the limits of that power than is
apparent from an isolated reading of the Hanna and Stewart decisions.
The uncertainty as to the extent of federal power to displace state law
through procedural rules in the federal courts may have influenced
Congress' decision to be cautious about displacing state law when it
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. In 1972, the Advisory Com-
mittee proposed comprehensive Federal Rules of Evidence, which
were transmitted to Congress by the Court.1 53 Among other things,
the proposed Rules restricted the privileges available in federal court
to those listed in the Rules, and the scope of those privileges was nar-
rower than that enjoyed in many states. The proposed Rules were to
displace state law in all cases in federal court, including diversity cases.
The Advisory Committee, relying on the Court's decision in Hanna,
a body of law that was until recently regarded as an appropriate subject for the exer-
cise of state sovereignty .... ).
151 See also Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th
Cir. 1984). In Moe, the court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which excludes
evidence of subsequent remedial measures as proof of culpability (and which was en-
acted by Congress), was not applicable in a diversity case when state law would admit
the evidence, on the ground that the matter was one of state substantive law, and that
to apply the Federal Rule would be an "unwarranted incursion into the Erie doctrine."
Id. at 932. But see Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
152 But see Stewart, supra note 139, at 533 (" [T] he limitation Congress has imposed
on the Supreme Court's rulemaking power-that procedural and evidentiary rules
must not displace substantive law-should be imposed on Congress as well if Con-
gress lacks the authority to create the substantive law it displaces. Otherwise, the gen-
eral police power which the constitutional structure sought to keep out of federal
hands may creep in through a door thought to be locked by Erie.").
153 The proposed rules of evidence are reprinted at 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). For an
overview of the proposed rules, see generally William L. Hungate, An Introduction to
the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 32 FED. BJ. 225 (1973).
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rejected arguments that state rules of privilege are substantive law
which, under the doctrine of Erie, had to be applied by federal courts
sitting in diversity cases. 15 4 Congress, apparently, was of a different
view. For the first time in thirty-five years since the Rules Enabling Act
was passed, Congress suspended the effectiveness of the proposed
Rules, 15 5 then rewrote the evidence Rules and enacted them into
law.'56 Most notably, the proposed Rules on privileges were com-
pletely revised to require the application of state law whenever state
law provides the substantive rule of decision.
15 7
It was against this constitutional backdrop that Congress dele-
gated to the Court rulemaking authority in the Rules Enabling Act.
Before going on to examine the scope of that delegation, there re-
main two constitutional issues raised by the Act. The first is whether
the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Court is constitutional.
The second is whether the supersession provision of the Act, which
provides that laws in conflict with valid Rules promulgated under the
Act are of "no further force or effect,"' 58 is constitutionally valid.
C. Constitutionality of the Delegation Under the Rules Enabling Act
We have seen that even in the absence of a congressional delega-
tion, the federal judiciary has inherent authority to regulate practice
and procedure before it, at least through procedural common law
pronouncements and, more dubiously, through some prospective
154 See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 501, Proposed Rules of Evidence, 56
F.R.D. at 233 (arguing that after Hanna, the decision whether to give state privileges
effect was one "of choice rather than necessity"). In support of the Committee's con-
clusion, see Wright, supra note 141, at 573. But see Goldberg, supra note 37, at 682
n.86 ("It is likely that the Advisory Committee, relying on the Court's application in
Hanna of a federal rule of civil procedure which contravened state law, reasoned that
an analogous situation would exist if a federal rule of evidence contravened state law.
However, this analogy is untenable because it fails to consider the inherent differ-
ences between a rule of procedure regulating service of process and a rule of evi-
dence involving significant substantive rights.").
155 Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The title of the Act, an
"Act to promote the separation of constitutional powers," indicates Congress' concern
that the Court had overstepped its constitutional and statutory rulemaking authority.
156 Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. For a detailed re-
counting of Congress' intervention and redrafting of the evidence rules, see WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, 21 FEDERAL PRACrICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 5006 (1977).
157 See Fed. R. EvlD. 501 ("[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness ... shall be determined in accordance with State law."). Refer-
ences to state law are found also in Federal Rule of Evidence 302, which concerns the
effect of presumptions, and Rule 601, which concerns the competency of witnesses.
158 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
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rulemaking. A relatively small part of that inherent power, such as the
power to sanction for contempt, may not be materially impaired by
Congress, but the greater part of the inherent power of the judicial
branch is subject to congressional control. Given the inherent power
of the judicial branch, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has
long rejected arguments that rulemaking power is a nonadjudicative
function that, under Articles I and III, cannot be delegated to the
courts. 159 Rather, the Court has held, correctly, that Congress may
delegate procedural rulemaking power to the Court, provided that
the delegation does not include "powers which are strictly and exclu-
sively legislative. '160 Thus, it seems that Congress may legitimately
delegate to the Court authority to regulate by prospective rule matters
that fall within the scope of the courts' inherent authority to regulate
procedure, as it has with the Rules Enabling Act.161 The shared au-
thority of Congress and the judicial branch over procedure is, by defi-
nition, not a "strictly and exclusively legislative" power. 162 The Court
also has held that the specific delegation of the Rules Enabling Act is
159 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 83; Redish, supra note 83.
160 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825).
161 Indeed, as discussed below, the matters as to which rulemaking authority has
been delegated to the Court are narrower than the area of matters as to which the
courts have inherent authority to make common law procedural pronouncements. It
does not follow, however, that the REA was unnecessary surplusage. Even though the
judicial branch has inherent authority in the area reached by the delegation, the am-
biguity as to whether that inherent authority includes authority to promulgate pro-
spective rules is enough to demonstrate the necessity, or at least wisdom, of the
delegation in the Rules Enabling Act. See supra text accompanying note 69. The dele-
gation to the Court can also be seen as a statement of congressional intent generally
to defer to the Court in this area. Furthermore, even if it were uncontested that the
Supreme Court has constitutional authority to promulgate supervisory rules of proce-
dure for federal courts, the Court, acting without any assistance from the Judicial
Conference or its committees, is hardly up to the task. Thus, the process established
by the Rules Enabling Act, and the "rulemaking infrastructure" created by Congress,
has an independent value. Cf Carrington, supra note 86, at 974-75.
162 Cf Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719
(1980). In Consumers Union, the Court found that in promulgating disciplinary rules
for the Bar, the Virginia Supreme Court was acting in a legislative capacity, as the
disciplinary rules "'are rules of general application and are statutory in character.
They act not on parties litigant but on all those who practice law in Virginia. They do
not arise out of a controversy which must be adjudicated, but instead out of a need to
regulate conduct for the protection of all citizens."' Id. at 731 (citing Consumers
Union v. American Bar Ass'n, 470 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (1979) (Warriner, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part)). Rules of procedure, on the other hand, operate
only on litigants, not anyone outside of the courtroom.
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constitutionally permissible.' 63 The delegatiqn does satisfy the re-
quirements of the Court-articulated nondelegation doctrine. It in-
cludes "intelligible principle [s]"' 164 to govern the exercise of the
Court's discretion, in that it limits the Court to promulgating Rules of
"practice and procedure" that do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."'165 It also provides for congressional oversight of
the exercise of the power through the "report and wait" provision.
66
Moreover, and more importantly, it does not impermissibly aggran-
dize the role of the judiciary at the expense of Congress or assign to
the Court "tasks that are more properly accomplished"167 by Congress,
as rules of procedure are intimately related to the business of the judi-
cial branch, which has greater expertise than Congress in this matter.
Furthermore, rules of procedure concern matters as to which the judi-
cial branch has some degree of inherent authority.
D. Constitutionality of the Supersession Provision
More problematic is the question of the constitutionality of the
supersession provision of § 2072(b), which provides that "[a] 11 laws in
conflict with such rules [promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act]
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken ef-
163 See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted
power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that
power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not incon-
sistent with the statutes or constitution (sic] of the United States .... .") (footnote
omitted); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387-88 (1989) (citing Sib-
bach, 312 U.S. at 9-10, for authority that delegation under the Rules Enabling Act is
an example of a constitutionally permissible delegation to the Court); Carole E.
Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REv. 395,
437-41 (1976) (concluding that the delegation of the REA is valid); Robert N. Clin-
ton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the
Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. Rrv. 15, 71-72 (1977) (concluding the delegation of
rulemaking authority in the REA is valid, but contesting the validity of the superses-
sion clause). But see Redish, supra note 83, at 316 (arguing that the delegation of
rulemaking power is violative of separation of powers concerns, and reading Sibbach as
not directly ruling on the validity of the REA under the case-or-controversy
requirement).
164 See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
165 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (b) (1994).
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994). The efficacy of that oversight is, admittedly,
rather limited. See infra text accompanying notes 231-33.
167 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383. But see Redish, supra note 83, at 311-14 (arguing
that Mistretta's functional test for separation of powers is "all but unworkable." Id. at
311)). See also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), and the discussion
of that case in Van Alstyne, supra note 68, at 124-25.
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fect. 1 68 Although the constitutional validity of the provision has been
the subject of much debate, 169 the validity of the provision has never
been ruled upon by the Supreme Court.
170
The Court's recent decision in Clinton v. New York,17 1 holding the
Line Item Veto Act invalid, may produce renewed calls for examina-
tion of the validity of the supersession provision. A thorough analysis
of that issue, including a consideration of the Court's decision in the
Line Item Veto Act case, as well as the earlier decision in Chadha,
172
will be the subject of a separate Article.
That Article will argue that the supersession clause is valid, pro-
vided that the substantive rights limitation of the REA is given effect in
the way this Article suggests. If the scope of the REA's delegation of
authority to the Court is read in an appropriately narrow manner to
avoid constitutional infirmity, Rules promulgated under the Act are
168 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994). The 1934 Rules Enabling Act's supersession provi-
sion was substantially the same: "[The rules] shall take effect six months after their
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force
or effect." Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
169 See Burbank, supra note 32, at 1050-54. See also Clinton, supra note 163, at 65,
77; H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 16 (1985) (citing Burbank, supra note 32); Rules Enabling
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 100th Cong. 1077 (1988).
170 On occasion, the Court has stated that it has no authority to promulgate Rules
inconsistent with federal statutes. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353
n.1 1 (1959) ("The power of the Court to prescribe rules of procedure exists only in
the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.") In Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters
Local No. 70, 94 S. Ct. 1113, 1122 (1974) (Adv. Sheeted.), the Court stated "We do not
doubt that were there an actual conflict between [a statute] and [a Rule] the statute
would control." The opinion was revised to delete this statement when the bound
volume of the reports was issued. See Clinton, supra note 163, at 73. In other deci-
sions, the Court has appeared to assume the validity of the provision. See Henderson
v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996). In Henderson, the supersession issue was not
squarely presented, as the Rule in question had been enacted by Congress. The
Court, however, appeared to assume the validity of that provision when it noted that
"[a]s the United States acknowledges ... a Rule made law by congress supersedes
conflicting laws no less than a Rule this Court prescribes." Id. at 1646. Cf Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (assuming first that a similar supersession provi-
sion for the Rules of Criminal Procedure would result in the repeal of a statute by a
later enacted rule, but then noting that the supersession was a "difficult question" the
Court need not face in that case). Cf Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1940) (stating first that Congress may delegate to the courts "authority to make rules
not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United States," and then stat-
ing that "the rules, if they are within the authority granted by Congress, repeal [the
Conformity Act]). In note 40 of its decision, the Court distinguished the REA's super-
session clause from the Line Item Veto Act.
171 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
172 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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not inherently "legislative," in the sense the term in used in Chadha, as
they will not "alter[ ] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons
.... ,"17 Furthermore, in contrast to the power Congress attempted to
give the President in the Line Item Veto Act, the Court has been dele-
gated authority to regulate only matters that are well within the judi-
cial branch's inherent authority over procedure.174
Therefore, valid Rules, even those that supersede statutes, are not
subject to the bicamerality and presentment requirements of Article I.
The key question, to which this Article will turn next, is when does a
Rule impermissibly affect substantive rights? Briefly, that issue is de-
termined by a number of factors, including the extent to which Con-
gress has legislated in the area. When Congress has legislated
extensively on a procedural matter, it is presumed to have done so
fully aware of the Rules Enabling Act and Rules promulgated pursuant
to that Act. 175 The congressional choice to enact legislation indicates
a policy decision, which presumptively places the matter into the area
of "substantive rights" and outside of the scope of matters delegated
to the Court. Thus, statutes with a substantive purpose, particularly
those not enacted as a part of the Rules, are not subject to superses-
sion, as a Court-promulgated Rule in conflict with the statute would
impermissibly affect a substantive right within the meaning of the
REA. A decision by Congress to place a procedural provision in the
Rules, as with the Federal Rules of Evidence, is a strong, but rebutta-
ble, indication that Congress perceives the matter to be procedural,
and thus subject to supersession. 17 6 The supersession clause therefore
will have a limited role, provided that the restriction on Rules modify-
ing, abridging, or enlarging substantive rights is taken seriously, and
173 Id. at 952.
174 In this respect, the delegation of authority to cancel laws under the REA is very
different than the delegation in the Line Item Veto Act. The REA in no way aggran-
dizes the power of the judiciary beyond that envisaged in the constitutional structure.
Providing the President with a line item veto, by contrast, results effectively in an end-
run around the constitutional scheme set up in Article I, whereby the President is
permitted a veto only of legislation prior to its passage, and has no inherent authority
to cancel legislation after enactment pursuant to Article I. Cf Clinton, 118 S. Ct. 2091
(1998).
175 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-422, at 13-17 (1985).
176 With the Rules of Evidence, Congress singled out Rules governing privileges as
substantive, and thus requiring an affirmative act of Congress. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074(b) (1994), any Court-promulgated Rule "creating, abolishing, or modifying an
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress."
See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
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should come into play only to rid the statute books of "procedural
marginalia.
177
In the past, however, the Court has never found a Rule invalid as
beyond the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, but has upheld against
challenge questionable Rules, such as Rule 35, which appears to im-
permissibly affect substantive rights. 178 The failure by the Court to
take seriously the limits on its authority to promulgate Rules could
create a problem with the supersession provision. If a Rule promul-
gated under the REA impermissibly intrudes on an area reserved to
Congress, it should be adjudged invalid under the REA. If it is not,
and if the supersession clause is given effect, a Rule that should be
adjudged invalid for impermissibly affecting substantive rights would
effectively repeal a statute, and a true Article I and separation of pow-
ers problem would be created. Because of the possibility of such erro-
neous rulings, Professor Burbank has expressed doubts about the
constitutionality, and wisdom, of the supersession provision. 179 But,
this possibility does not so much demonstrate the invalidity of the su-
persession provision as it demonstrates the importance of taking the
"substantive rights" provision of the REA seriously. As will be seen
below, the Court has in a few recent decisions indicated its increased
willingness to do so. The Court's jurisprudence in the area is mud-
dled, and the meaning of the REA's substantive rights limitation has
yet to be made clear, a task this Article has set out to accomplish.
III. THE ALLOCATION OF RULEMAKING AuTHORIry UNDER THE RULES
ENABLING Acr
With the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has delegated to the
Supreme Court the power to make supervisory Rules of procedure for
177 See Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act,
1989 DuKE L.J. 281, 325. But see Burbank, supra note 4, at 1044 ("As originally formu-
lated, the supersession clause was intended to 'clear... undergrowth,' although it was
by no means limited to 'procedural marginalia.' Nor is it so limited today.
(citations omitted).
178 See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S 1 (1941); cf Rowe, supra note 4, at 982 (arguing
that Rule 35 would be invalid in the face of a state law reflecting a substantive policy
choice). This Article, in Part IV.B, below, disputes Professor Rowe's thesis, and con-
tends that the legislative policy of the state legislature is not determinative of the
validity of federal Rules).
179 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1036-37 (arguing that if the Court had promul-
gated amendments to Rule 68 that had been proposed in 1983 and 1984, and which
appeared to transgress the "substantive rights" limitations of the REA, the Court also
would have found that the Rule superseded conflicting statutes governing attorney's
fees, a result he considers violative of the Constitution).
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federal courts. In its present form, the Rules Enabling Act sets out the
modem rulemaking scheme:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in
the United States district courts (including proceedings before mag-
istrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect.
The basic mechanism for promulgating the Rules is set out in the
Act as well.' 80 An Advisory Committee drafts proposed amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are reviewed by a
Standing Committee on Rules and Procedures, and then by the Judi-
cial Conference. The proposed amendments are then sent to the
179 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The 1934 version of the Act was similar, but provided
only for rules of civil procedure:
Be it enacted, etc., That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United
States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process,
writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil ac-
tions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the sub-
stantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six months after their
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no
further force or effect.
Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (repealed 1988). Before the
1988 legislation amending the Act, which provided a uniform mechanism for promul-
gating rules of procedure and evidence, authority to enact rules of evidence and pro-
mulgate rules of procedure in criminal cases, criminal proceedings and bankruptcy
proceedings was contained in separate statutes. See, e.g., Act of Jan 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, § 2(a) (1), 88 Stat. 1926, 1948-49, amended ty Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-149, § 2, 89 Stat. 805 (rules of evidence). These Acts were repealed by the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (the 1988 Rules Enabling Act), Pub.
L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 401(c), 102 Stat. 4642, 4650 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970)
(bankruptcy rules); 28 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, 3772 (1970) (criminal procedure). See
generally Burbank, supra note 32, for an exhaustive and illuminating history of the
Rules Enabling Act.
180 Since 1958, the Judicial Conference has been legislatively charged with carry-
ing on "a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice
and procedure." Act ofJuly 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 331 (1994)). The Judicial Conference created the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, and five Advisory Committees, including one on the
rules of civil procedure. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrTED STATES, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 6-7
(1958). For a description of the rulemaking process generally, by the then-Reporter
for the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, see Carrington, supra note 29, at
2119-24.
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Supreme Court,18 1 which transmits them to Congress before May 1 of
the year in which they are to become effective. 182 Congress has until
December 1 to act, and if it does nothing, the amendments become
effective. 183 The language of the Act is relatively simple. But its mean-
ing, particularly the scope of authority delegated to the Court, and the
significance of the "substantive rights" limitation, has generated a
great deal of debate-and confusion-among commentators and the
Court. What is needed is a workable test that can be applied by the
courts, and by the Advisory Committee, in determining the validity, or
permissible scope, of Rules promulgated under the Act. Part IV of
this Article attempts to set out such a test. Before doing so, it is help-
ful to examine the Court's jurisprudence and the legislative history of
the 1988 amendments to the Act.
A. The "Myth of Federalism"'1
4
One area of confusion was the long-standing and widespread as-
sumption that the Act's prohibition on Rules affecting substantive
rights was intended to further the federalism principles reflected in
the Erie18 5 line of decisions. Those cases established that in diversity
cases, if a federal court policy or doctrine conflicts with state law, fed-
eral courts must apply state common law as well as state statutes in
order to assure that "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
... [will be] substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court,
'18 6
unless there is a countervailing federal interest sufficient to justify de-
viating from the state rule.' 8 7 In analyzing the Rules Enabling Act, the
Supreme Court has attributed to the substantive rights limitation in
the REA the federalism principle established in Erie. That is, the
Court views the REA restriction as one intended to prevent Federal
Rules from interfering with substantive rights created by state law, stat-
ing that "both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that
federal courts are to apply state 'substantive law' and federal 'proce-
dural' law .... ,18 8 Similarly, commentators for years focused on feder-
181 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's role in the rulemaking process, see
Moore, supra note 38.
182 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994).
183 Id.
184 Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
the Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 700 (1988).
185 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
186 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
187 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
188 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
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alism principles and the protection the Rules Enabling Act affords to
substantive state law.189
This preoccupation with the principles of federalism enunciated
in Erie was understandable, given that the first set of Federal Rules
came into effect on the heels of that decision. 190 Although Erie itself
did not involve a conflict between state law and a Federal Rule
promulgated under the REA, for years there was a great deal of confu-
sion as to whether the Erie doctrine, and York's outcome-determinative
test, governed such a conflict, particularly in light of the opinions in
the Cohen,191 Woods,192 and Ragan'9 3 decisions, which were widely in-
terpreted as applying an outcome-determinative test to determine the
applicability of Federal Rules.' 94 The Court clarified much with its
189 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Bead Game, 87
HARv. L. REy. 741 (1974); Ely, supra note 1, at 718-40;John Hart Ely, The Necklace, 87
HARv. L. REV. 753 (1974); Mishkin, supra note 111, at 1686-87 (1974) (recognizing
that the substantive rights limitation in the Rules Enabling Act reflects separation of
powers considerations, but considering the substantive rights limitation as primarily
resting on federalism concerns; the "constitutional perception that [federal] courts
are inappropriate makers of laws intruding upon the states' views of social policy in
the areas of state competence"); see also Darrell N. Braman, Jr. & Mark D. Neumann,
The Still Unrepressed Myth of Erie, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 403 (1989) (analyzing lower court
decisions against the 'benchmark' of Professor Ely's analysis).
190 The decision in Erie was rendered on April 25, 1938. The Rules of Civil Proce-
dure first came into effect on Sept. 16, 1938.
191 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (holding that a
federal court sitting in diversity was obligated to apply state law requiring a bond in
derivative suit, and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governed derivative
suits, did not address a bond requirement).
192 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (holding that a federal
court sitting in diversity was required to apply a state statute prohibiting foreign cor-
porations not qualified to do business in the state from suing in the state, but failing
to consider the potential conflict between that state law and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(b), which governs capacity to sue and be sued in a federal court).
193 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (holding
that state law requiring service of a summons to toll the statute of limitations applied,
and finding that the provision in Rule 3 for commencement of the action upon filing
did not govern tolling).
194 See, e.g., Merrigan, supra note 120, at 717 ("The York case, of necessity, spelled
death to the hope for a completely uniform federal procedure."); see also WRIGHT,
supra note 120, § 59, at 401-03 ("Many observers believed.. . that [after Cohen, Woods
and Ragan were decided] there was no longer much, if any, room for independent
federal regulation of procedure.... After the three 1949 decisions the draftsman of
the rules said that 'hardly a one of the heralded Federal Rules can be considered safe
from attack.'") (citations omitted). For a discussion and explanation of the confusion
about the meaning of these cases, see Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A
Review and Reappraisal After Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREiGHToN L.
REV. 1, 2-12 (1987).
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decision in Hanna v. Plumer.195 There, the Court stated that the Erie
line of cases did not govern when a Federal Rule was involved, and
explained the Cohen, Woods, and Ragan cases as situations in which the
Federal Rules were not applicable. In Hanna, the Court distinguished
between the case involving the "relatively unguided Erie choice," in
which federal policy or doctrine, as articulated by the court, conflicts
with state law, and the case in which a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
conflicts with state law. In the latter case, the Court explained, the
Rule will prevail, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, just as legislation
enacted by Congress would prevail, provided that the Rule is validly
enacted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and does not violate the
"substantive rights" limitation. In Hanna, however, the Court charac-
terized the main purpose of the "substantive rights" limitation as the
protection of state substantive law, and the commentators accepted
the view virtually without question.
1 96
B. Exploding the Myth-Separation of Powers Concerns in the REA
This "myth of federalism"-that in limiting the Court's rulemak-
ing authority in the Rules Enabling Act, Congress was primarily con-
cerned with preventing the inappropriate displacement of state
substantive law by a Federal Rule-was exploded by Professor Bur-
bank in his exhaustive and illuminating study of the history of the
1934 Rules Enabling Act.197 In a detailed analysis of the legislative
history of the Act, Professor Burbank demonstrated, and it now is gen-
erally accepted, 9 8 that the lawmakers who drafted and enacted into
law the Rules Enabling Act were primarily concerned with the alloca-
tion of "power to make federal law prospectively between the
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress, not to protect lawmaking
195 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
196 See id. at 465. In his influential and seminal article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,
Professor Ely clarified even further the distinctions drawn in Hanna. Ely, supra note
1. Professor Burbank has stated that while Professor Ely's article was helpful in dispel-
ling the "myth" that the Erie analysis governed in cases concerning the Federal Rules:
[it helped] to entrench another.., the myth of federalism, which would
have us believe that, four years before Erie-when Swift v. Tyson was in full
flower-and in a statute authorizing rules of practice and procedure for all
civil litigation in the federal courts-litigation that even in the early 1930's
involved predominantly questions of federal substantive law-Congress was
only concerned, or even primarily concerned, about the inappropriate dis-
placement of state law.
Burbank, supra note 184, at 700.
197 Burbank, supra note 32.
198 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 38, at 1043; Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 4,
at 298.
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that has already occurred, and certainly not to protect only state
law."' 99 Rather, Congress was primarily concerned that prospective
federal lawmaking involving policy decisions, or requiring choices
among competing interests, be left to Congress, 200 and that the
Court's power to make procedural Rules be exercised in as politically
neutral a fashion as possible.201 As Professor Burbank points out, it
makes little sense to think that Congress' motivating concern was that
Court-promulgated Rules might inappropriately displace substantive
state laws. The Rules Enabling Act was passed in 1934-four years
before Erie was decided. At that time, under the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson,202 federal courts were considered free to fashion general fed-
eral common law in the absence of congressional or state legislative
action, so that federalism issues simply did not have the significance
that they have today in diversity cases. 2
03
Thus, Congress' animating concern with the Rules Enabling Act
in 1934 was the allocation of authority between Congress and the
Supreme Court. As we shall examine in more detail below, this same
concern was at the heart of the 1988 revisions to the Act.20 4 This does
not mean that the Act does not also afford some protection to state
substantive law. As Professor Burbank has noted, the Act "holds the
potential to serve federalism values, protecting both existing and po-
tential state law by remitting to Congress the decision whether there
shall be prospective federal law on 'substantive' matters and the con-
tent of that law." 205 That is, Congress has reserved to itself the deci-
sion whether there should be prospective federal procedural law
where it has the potential of displacing substantive state law. There
are matters falling within state competence that are rationally capable
of classification as procedural, but are so "substantive" as to be beyond
the scope of authority delegated to the Court under the REA. As to
those matters, state law is subject to displacement only by act of Con-
gress, or in limited cases, federal common law, and not by prospective
Court-promulgated Rule.
20 6
That the Rules Enabling Act reflects separation of powers con-
cerns does not mean that it simply codifies the constitutional alloca-
199 Burbank, supra note 184, at 700.
200 See generally Burbank, supra note 32.
201 See Carrington, supra note 177; Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 4, at 480.
202 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
203 See Burbank, supra note 184, at 700; see also Moore, supra note 38, at 1043.
204 On the legislative history of the 1988 Rules Enabling Act, see generally Bur-
bank, supra note 4, at 1029-40. See also Moore, supra note 38, at 1047-51.
205 Burbank, supra note 184, at 700-01.
206 See H.R. REP. 99-422, at 22 (1985).
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tion of authority over rulemaking. It does not. Rather, with both the
original 1934 Rules Enabling Act and its amendment in 1988, Con-
gress retained for itself exclusive authority to make federal law that
"modifies, abridges, or enlarges substantive rights." "Substantive
rights," as the term is used in the Act, includes matters, such as subject
matter jurisdiction, as to which rulemaking authority could not consti-
tutionally be delegated to the Court,20 7 as well as matters, such as
venue20 8 or limitations periods, 20 9 as to which rulemaking authority
could constitutionally be delegated to the Court.2 10 However, the
207 See supra note 98. In this regard, the grant to the Court of authority to make
rules defining the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts of appeals, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1292(e), 2072(c) (1994), raises interesting questions of constitutional validity,
which, though deserving of study, are beyond the scope of this Article.
208 Venue is beyond the power of the Court because, by virtue of longstanding and
extensive regulation by Congress, it involves a "substantive right" within the meaning
of the REA. Cf Whitten, supra note 70. In the absence of congressional legislation,
however, courts could exercise inherent power to determine issues of venue.
209 See H.R. REP. 99-422, at 22 (1985) ("The bill does not confer power on the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and preclu-
sion, that necessarily and obviously define or limit rights under the substantive law.").
There is, however, some inherent judicial power to determine the time in which ac-
tions must be filed, as illustrated by the doctrine of laches. Nonetheless, there may be
constitutional limitations on the Court's-and Congress'-ability to declare limita-
tions periods for matters governed by state law. See infra note 310 and accompanying
text.
210 There is some debate as to whether Congress could delegate to the Court au-
thority to make rules that affect substantive rights. To a large extent, that debate is
tied up with the debate as to the meaning of the phrase "substantive rights" in the
Rules Enabling Act. Some commentators argue that the restriction on Rules affecting
substantive rights merely incorporates restrictions imposed by the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, and particularly by the Article III requirement that the Court make
law only in "cases or controversies" before it. See Mishkin, supra note 111, at 1686-87:
Congress' explicit refusal to delegate to the Court any power to "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right" in my view rests upon-and re-
states-the constitutional perception that courts are inappropriate makers
of laws intruding upon the states' view of social policy in the areas of state
competence. Courts interpreting that Act are under a duty to give full scope
to that prohibition-a legislative prohibition expressive of basic constitu-
tional principles not only of federalism but also of differentiation of powers.
(emphasis added).
Compare Carrington, supra note 177, at 287 ("IT]he Court cannot make substantive
rules by any means other than writing opinions in 'cases or controversies' without
taking leave of its role as defined by Article III.") with Burbank, supra note 32, at 1113
(arguing that the legislative history of the Act indicates that the Act's substantive
rights limitation was intended to impose a limitation on the Court's rulemaking au-
thority independent of, and in addition to, the constitutional separation of powers
restrictions).
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Court's jurisprudence on this point is muddled. In several decisions,
it seems to treat the Rules Enabling Act as a plenary delegation of
Congress' entire power to regulate practice and procedure, while rec-
ognizing, nonetheless, that the REA imposes an additional limitation
on the Court's rulemaking authority.
21 1
C. The Supreme Court Decisions Prior to the 1988 Amendments to
the REA
Sibbach v. Wilson212 was the Court's first decision on a challenge to
the validity of a Rule. In that case, the plaintiff challenged Fed. R. Civ.
P. 35, which provided that the district court could order a physical or
mental examination of a party. Although the plaintiff admitted that
the Rule regulated procedure, she argued that it affected a "substan-
tive right," and thus was beyond the scope of authority delegated to
the Court by the Rules Enabling Act. But the admission by the plain-
tiff that the Rule concerned procedure proved fatal to her case; to the
majority, matters of procedure and matters of substance were mutu-
ally exclusive. Despite the text of the Act, which seems to recognize
that substance and procedure are overlapping categories and to con-
template that a rule of procedure may affect substantive rights, the
Court was of the opinion that a rule is either procedural or it affects
substantive rights; it cannot be both.213 The only test for validity
under the REA, the Court stated:
[M]ust be whether a rule really regulates procedure-the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them.
214
To the Court, the phrase "substantive rights" was confined to
rights "conferred by law," such as the "right not to be injured in one's
211 See infra text accompanying notes 223-25. Furthermore, the Court does seem
to recognize that not all of Congress' power over procedure may be delegated to the
Court because of separation of powers concerns. For example, in Sibbach, the Court
noted: "There are other limitations upon the authority to prescribe rules which might
have been, but were not mentioned in the Act; for instance, the inability of a court, by
rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute." Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941).
212 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
213 For an argument that the text of the Rules Enabling Act contemplates that
some procedural rules may impermissibly affect substantive rights, and thus are be-
yond the scope of authority delegated to the Court, see Ely, supra note 1, at 718-19.
See also Rowe, supra note 4, at 977-81; Whitten, supra note 195, at 5.
214 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
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person by another's negligence." 21 5 The argument that the Rule per-
mitting physical examinations infringed on an important right that
had been previously recognized did not sway the Court, which noted
that the states were split as to whether courts could require submission
to examination in discovery. By which authority, the Court asked, had
such a right been recognized? Under the old Conformity Act,216 fed-
eral courts would have permitted examinations in a state where they
were permitted in state court, and would not have ordered them in
states where they were not permitted in state court. On the grounds
that there had previously been no uniform federal policy on the issue,
the Court rejected the argument that the new Federal Rule was a ma-
jor change in policy.
The Sibbach decision was as much a creature of its time as the Erie
decision was,217 coming as it did a mere three years after the first set
of uniform Federal Rules of procedure were promulgated. The neces-
sity for a uniform Federal Rule on a matter of discovery seemed para-
mount. The Court could not readily accept that the availability of a
physical exam in a federal court might vary from state to state, just as
it had under the Conformity Act. It must have been counterintuitive
to the Court, and does not seem to have been argued by the plaintiff,
that the substantive rights limitation was intended to reserve certain
areas for prospective regulation by Congress only, so that only a con-
gressional enactment, and not a Court-promulgated Rule, could oper-
ate to preempt state law on the matter.218 Equally incongruous to the
Court may have been the notion that a matter of such significance
that it was removed from the Court's authority, was not sufficiently
important for Congress to have legislated. Furthermore, the Court
noted, Congress had the opportunity to review the Rules, and, as it
did not act, it obviously found no transgression of the authority it had
conferred on the Court.
The Sibbach test for validity of a Rule under the REA-"whether a
rule really regulates procedure"-sounds very much like the defini-
215 Id at 13.
216 Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872). The Conformity Act
required that federal trial courts in cases at common law follow the procedure of the
state in which they were located.
217 Cf. Ely, supra note 1, at 702 (describing the Erie decision as a "creature of its
time").
218 The Court assumed also that if the Rule was substantive within the meaning of
the REA, it would be substantive also for conflicts of law purposes, and thus the Indi-
ana state rule would govern, to allow the examination. Here the Court went further
astray in assuming that substance and procedure have the same meaning for all
purposes.
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tion of Congress' constitutional authority to regulate practice and pro-
cedure in the federal courts which, the Court in Hanna v. Plumer later
held, "includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are ra-
tionally capable of classification as either. '21 9 Virtually any rule "ra-
tionally capable of classification as procedural"-that is, virtually all
rules-can be said to "really regulate procedure." Thus, the Court
treated the grant of authority to prescribe general Rules of procedure
(in what is now § 2072 (a)) as a plenary grant of Congress' power to
regulate procedure. In doing so, the Court ignored the limiting lan-
guage of what is now § 2072(b), that Rules could not impermissibly
affect substantive rights.220 The real issue for validity under the Rules
Enabling Act is not whether the Rule is one that regulates procedure,
within the meaning of § 2072 (a), but whether the Rule impermissibly
affects substantive rights within the meaning of § 2072(b).
The Court again ignored the limiting language of the REA in the
Hanna case. There, the Court seemed to recognize that the Rules
Enabling Act imposes a restriction on the Court's rulemaking author-
ity separate from and in addition to the constitutional limitation on
Congress' authority,22' but failed to define the difference between the
constitutional limits on Congress' power and the limits imposed by
the Rules Enabling Act on the Court's rulemaking authority. Rather,
the Court simply cited the Sibbach test-"whether a rule really regu-
lates procedure"-to determine validity under the Act, thus conflating
the test for Congress' constitutional authority with the test for the
Court's authority under the Rules Enabling Act. With few exceptions,
the Court has persisted in conflating the two tests. As late as 1988, in
Mistretta, the Court buttressed its finding that a delegation of author-
ity to the judiciary to create federal sentencing guidelines was consti-
tutional by stating "we have recognized that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure regulate matters 'falling within the uncertain area between
219 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
220 In his article Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Professor Burbank argued that the
limiting language of the 1934 Act, prohibiting the promulgation of rules that "modify,
abridge or enlarge substantive rights," was surplusage, serving only to emphasize the
inherent restriction in the use of the word "procedure," which, he argued, referred
only to matters of pure procedure fit for regulation by courts. Regardless, he was
critical of the Court's decisions in Sibbach and other cases, as upholding rules that
exceed the authority delegated to the Court. See Burbank, supra note 32, at 1107-08.
Professor Ely, by contrast, concluded that the limiting language was not surplusage.
See Ely, supra note 1, at 718-19; see also Rowe, supra note 4, at 981.
221 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (holding that Rule 4(d) (1) "neither exceeded the
congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed consti-
tutional bounds").
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substance and procedure, [and] are rationally capable of classification
as either.' 2
22
In the few decisions in which the Court acknowledged that the
Act's prohibition against Rules that affect substantive rights has signifi-
cance independent of the constitutional test of whether a Rule is "ra-
tionally capable of classification" as procedural, it still failed to
articulate any coherent standard for distinguishing procedural Rules
that impermissibly affect substantive rights from those that do not. In
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,223 the Court considered a chal-
lenge to the former Rule 4(f), which permitted service anywhere in
the state in which the federal court was situated, even outside of the
district. Prior to the promulgation of the Rule, service could be made
only within the district. Thus, the defendant argued, Rule 4(f) imper-
missibly affected its substantive rights by extending the jurisdiction of
the court. In rejecting the argument, the Court recognized the re-
striction on Rules affecting substantive rights, but held that although
the application of the service provision would result in subjecting the
litigants' rights to adjudication in a federal court, this was merely an
"incidental effect[ ]" on substantive rights that was permitted by the
Act.224 In language reminiscent of Sibbach, the Court noted that the
provision for service "relates merely to 'the manner and the means by
which a right to recover.., is enforced'.... But it does not operate to
abridge, enlarge, or modify the rules of decision by which th[e] court
will adjudicate [the litigants'] rights."225 But the Court does not make
clear how much of an "incidental effect" on substantive rights is per-
missible under the Rules Enabling Act.
In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,2 2 6 the Court stretched
the concept of permissible "incidental effects" so far as to render it
meaningless. There, the Court was faced with an argument that Rule
38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure exceeded the author-
ity of the Rules Enabling Act. The Rule, which affords federal courts
of appeals plenary discretion to award damages to an appellee when
an appeal has been frivolous, was held to override a state rule impos-
ing a fixed ten percent penalty on appellants who obtain stays ofjudg-
ment pending appeals that ultimately are unsuccessful. The Court
noted that the Rule was rationally capable of classification as proce-
222 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (Blackmun, J.) (citing
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.) See also Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 468 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
224 Id. at 445.
225 Id. at 445-46 (citations omitted).
226 480 U.S. 1 (1986). For a criticism of Burlington, see Whitten, supra note 194.
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dural, and thus satisfied the Hanna test of constitutionality. While the
Court recognized that the Rules Enabling Act imposed an "additional
requirement" that a Rule not "enlarge, abridge or modify any substan-
tive right," it also noted, citing Murphree and Hanna, that an "inciden-
tal" impact on substantive rights was permitted, so long as the Rule in
question is "reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity" of the
"uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice
and procedure ... .-"227 Again, as in Sibbach, the Court seemed unable
to contemplate that there might be no governing federal norm be-
cause the "cardinal purpose" of the Rules Enabling Act was the provi-
sion of a uniform system of federal Rules.
Thus, as in Sibbach, the desire for uniformity was paramount to
the Court and determinative of the issue presented by the case. The
Court could not seem to contemplate that Congress might have re-
served for itself the authority to preempt state law on the issue and
that state law would control if Congress did not act. The test in Bur-
lington, in the end, is really no different than the Sibbach test: so long
as the Rule really regulates procedure it is valid, it seems, regardless of
the impact on substantive rights.
The Court not only failed to recognize any meaningful limits on
its ability to promulgate Rules under the Rules Enabling Act, but also
compounded its error by imbuing the Rules with a strong presump-
tion of validity on the grounds that the Advisory Committee, the
Court, and Congress, during the process of promulgating the Rules,
have made a prima facie judgment that the Rules do not violate the
Act.228 Repeatedly, Congress' failure to act to enforce the limitations
of the Rules Enabling Act has been pointed to by the Supreme Court
as evidence that Congress agrees that the Rules do not exceed the
authority granted in the Rules Enabling Act.229 This conclusion that
congressional inaction amounts to a tacit approval of the Rules is, as
Justice Frankfurter said in his dissent in Sibbach, an "appeal to unreal-
ity."230 Sometimes Congress' failure to act reflects only the failure of
both the House and the Senate to agree on the language of the legis-
lation 231-the failure of Congress to act to delay the effectiveness of
227 Burlington, 480 U.S. at 5 (citing, inter alia, Hanna and Mississippi Publ'g).
228 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; see also Burlington, 480 U.S. at 6.
229 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1941); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
230 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
231 See Mishkin, supra note 111, at 1687 ("One important aspect of the fallacy [of
the conclusion that Congressional inaction is an approval of the Rules] may be per-
ceived from the fact that Congress will be deemed to have failed to act even if both
Houses have passed specific bills so long as the two have not adopted identical lan-
guage."); see also Burbank, supra note 32, at 1102.
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the 1993 amendments to the discovery provisions is a recent exam-
ple.232 The prohibition in the Rules Enabling Act should be enough;
Congress should not have to act affirmatively each time to ensure it is
respected.233
It is equally unrealistic to assume that the Court, in transmitting
proposed Rule amendments to Congress, has made a determination
that the Rules are valid. As Justices Douglas and Black complained
several times in dissents from submissions of amendments of the Rules
to Congress, the Rules are given the Court's imprimatur without any
real involvement by the Court in their drafting or any real considera-
tion by the Court as to their validity. On that basis, Justices Black and
Douglas urged that the Court be relieved of any role in the rulemak-
ing process, arguing that the "[t] ransfer of the function to the judicial
Conference would relieve us of the embarrassment of having to sit in
judgment on the constitutionality of rules which we have approved
and which as applied in given situations might have to be declared
invalid."234 In 1980, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, also noted that the Court's role in the rulemaking process
was "largely formalistic." 235 Justice White, just prior to his retirement
from the Court, echoed these sentiments in his statement on the sub-
mission of the 1993 Rules amendments to Congress: "[t]he Court's
role [in the rulemaking process] ... is to transmit the Judicial Confer-
ence's recommendations without change and without careful study
.... "236 The Chief Justice's transmittal letter itself disclaimed any
approval of the Rules: "While the Court is satisfied that the required
procedures have been observed, this transmittal does not necessarily
indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments
in the form submitted."237
232 See supra text accompanying note 48.
233 See Mishkin, supra note 111, at 1688 ("Where-as in the second sentence of
the Rules Enabling Act-Congress has affirmatively enacted explicit limits on the au-
thority it is delegating, it should not be put in the position of having to act affirma-
tively through both Houses again in order to prevent usurpation.").
234 Order of Jan. 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 869-70 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissent-
ing). See also Order of Feb. 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1031, 1032 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
235 Order of Apr. 19, 1980, 446 U.S. 997, 997-98 n.1 (Powell, Stewart and Rehn-
quist, JJ., dissenting).
236 Order of Apr. 22, 1993, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 505 (Statement ofJustice White). On the Court's role in
the rulemaking process, see generally Moore, supra note 38, at 1061-73.
237 Order of Apr. 22, 1993, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 403 (letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to
Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley, Apr. 22, 1993).
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D. The 1988 Rules Enabling Act
It was in the context of the Court's jurisprudence that Congress
amended the Rules Enabling Act in 1988. The Court apparently con-
sidered the "substantive rights" limitation as intended to protect state
substantive law from intrusion. The Court treated the Rules Enabling
Act as a plenary delegation of Congress' constitutional powers to
make procedural Rules for the federal courts, with virtually none of
that power reserved to Congress. And as Congress' constitutional
power was interpreted very broadly by the Court to include power to
regulate all matters "rationally capable of classification" 238 as proce-
dural, state law was afforded little protection by the substantive rights
limitation.
Propelled largely by Professor Burbank's study of the 1934 Rules
Enabling Act,23 9 commentators had begun to emphasize the alloca-
tion of power between Congress and the Court as the purpose behind
the prohibition against Rules affecting substantive rights. The alloca-
tion of power was of central concern when Congress turned its atten-
tion to revising the Rules amendment process in the 1980's. Although
the 1988 Rules Enabling Act retains the language of the original, in
that it delegates to the Court authority to promulgate Rules of proce-
dure subject to the condition that they not "abridge, enlarge or mod-
ify substantive right[s]," 24 0 the legislative history of the amended act
attempts to "clarif[y] the limitations on national or supervisory
rulemaking by the Supreme Court."'24 1 The 1985 House Judiciary
Committee report noted that the Court had "overstepped the
238 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989).
239 Burbank, supra note 32.
240 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
241 H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 5 (1985). Technical and typographical errors in the
Report were corrected at 132 CONG. REC. E1434 (1986). This is the report on H.R.
3550, whose language amending 28 U.S.C. § 2072, apart from language with respect
to the supersession clause (not at issue here) was identical to that ultimately passed in
1988. The Report on the 1988 House bill (which was the source of, and identical to,
the Senate bill) incorporated by reference House Report number 99-422. See H.R.
REP. No. 100-889 at 29 (1988). For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1988
amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, see Burbank, supra note 4, at 1030-36. See
also Moore, supra note 38, at 1043-49. Both Professors Burbank and Moore conclude
that the House Report is the best evidence of congressional intent with the Act. See
also Note, The Rules Enabling Act and the Limits of Rule 23, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2294,
2302-03 (1998). As discussed in note 256 below, however, the Senate Report pro-
vides contradictory evidence of congressional intent, which could make the House
Report seem, at least to those hostile to the use of legislative history, a back-door
attempt by the drafters of the House Report to redefine the terms of the REA in a
manner not agreed to by the Senate.
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bounds" of the authority delegated to it on several occasions, 242 and
warned that "[p]roposed section 2072 contains limitations on the
rulemaking power, careful observance of which is essential in the fu-
ture if [similar] problems ... are not to recur.
'243
The Committee elaborated on the limitations placed on the
Court's rulemaking power by the Rules Enabling Act, relying heavily
on Professor Burbank's work in support.244 "The most important of
those limitations," the Committee stated, is the requirement "that
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court for lower federal courts (su-
pervisory court rules) be 'rules of practice and procedure' that do not
'abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." 245 This limiting
language, the Committee noted, "is derived from current law. As in-
terpreted by the Court, however, the language has little if any determi-
native content. As a result, the rules enabling acts have failed to
provide guidance to the rulemakers or to Congress in considering the
validity of proposed rules. '246 The Committee noted that in the 1934
Act the language apparently was "intended to emphasize some of the
limitations on the delegation of prospective lawmaking power thought
to inhere in the notion of court rules of 'practice and procedure.'"247
But, "[b] ecause there is no shared conception of such limitations to-
day, the Committee believes that it must take some care in stating its
views on the scope of Congress' delegation under proposed section
2072."248
First, the Committee emphasized, the Act "contains independent
limitations on ... court rulemaking" above and beyond the constitu-
tional limits on Congress' power to regulate procedure, and that Con-
gress had delegated "only a portion of [its] power" in the Rules
Enabling Act.249 Second, the Committee noted that the prohibition
against Rules affecting substantive rights is not solely a federalism con-
cern. Rather, it protects Congress' lawmaking prerogative not just in
cases in which state substantive law provides the rule of decision, but
also reserves to Congress its ability to regulate in purely federal mat-
242 H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 12 (1985).
243 Id. at 20.
244 See id. at 22. Professor Burbank appeared as an invited witness at hearings and
provided other assistance to the House Judiciary Committee in the development of
the 1988 revisions to the Rules Enabling Act. See id. at 7, 18; see also Burbank, supra
note 4, at 1012.
245 H.R. REP. 99-422 at 20.
246 Id.
247 M at 20-21.
248 Id. at 21.
249 Id
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ters, such as bankruptcy.25 0 Third, the Committee emphasized that
the allocation of powers between Congress and the Court was of pri-
mary importance, so that the substantive rights limitation is intended
to protect not just lawmaking that already has occurred, but also pro-
spective lawmaking. If Congress has not legislated in an area reserved
to it under the REA, state law, or, in some cases, federal common law,
will operate. 25 1 Fourth, the Committee commented on the meaning
of "substantive rights" in the Act. It began with the obvious:
IT]he substantive rights protected by proposed section 2072 in-
clude rights conferred, or that might be conferred, by rules of sub-
stantive law, such as "the right not to be injured.., by another's
negligence" or the right not to be subject to discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race. Thus, the bill does not confer power
on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding matters, such
as limitations and preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define
or limit rights under the substantive law.
252
The Committee quickly made clear that, contrary to the Court's
ruling in Sibbach,253 the term "substantive rights" was not confined to
"rights conferred by substantive law." Rather, the Committee stated:
The protection extends beyond rules of substantive law, narrowly
defined, however. At the least, it also prevents the application of
rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have the effect of al-
tering existing remedial rights conferred as an integral part of the
applicable substantive law scheme, federal or state, such as arrange-
ments for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. More generally,
proposed section 2072 is intended to allocate to Congress, as opposed to
the Supreme Court exercising delegated legislative power, lawmaking choices
that necessarily and obviously require consideration ofpolicies extrinsic to the
business of the courts, such as the recognition or non-recognition of a testimo-
nial privilege. In the absence of congressional choices, prospective regulation
is left to the States.
So viewed, proposed section 2072 leaves to the Supreme Court
primary responsibility for prospective federal regulation of matters
peculiarly within the competence ofjudges. It reserves to Congress
decisions concerning prospective federal regulation of matters pe-
culiarly within its competence, having regard to Congress' represen-
tative nature and to its experience in prospective lawmaking that





253 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1941).
254 H.R. REP. 99-422, at 21-22 (1985) (emphasis added).
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However, Congress did not change the language of the Act itself,
which, given the history of apparent reluctance of the Court to give
the limiting language any effect, may have been the surest way to en-
sure that a new interpretation be given the Rules Enabling Act by the
Court.25 5 Perhaps the scope of the delegation could have been clari-
fied by listing the rights that are "substantive" within the meaning of
the Act, and thus not subject to regulation by the Court. But Congress
does not want to micromanage procedural rules; that is why it left the
promulgation of Rules to the Judicial Conference and the Court in
the first place. Additionally, detailing the areas as to which the Court
has authority could lead to undesired consequences, as anything not
specifically listed may be assumed excluded.2 56 In the 1988 revisions
to the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has again used the broadest of
terms, recognizing that "[f] urther refinement of the scope of delega-
tion will undoubtedly prove necessary."257 It will be up to those who
propose amendments to the Rules, and ultimately the Court, to set
out the limits on the delegated authority. In doing so, they have little
choice but to look to the legislative history for whatever guidance it
255 See Moore, supra note 38, at 1049. The Senate Report accompanying the bill
stated that 2072(a) "consolidates but carries forward current law" and that 2072(b)
"also carries forward the scope of current law." 134 CONG. REC. 31056 (1988). This
language could be read as referring to judicial interpretations, as well as the language
of the Act itself. However, because the prior judicial interpretation was unsettled,
application of the "reenactment rule," or the presumption that Congress intended to
incorporate judicial interpretation, is inappropriate. Compare Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
510 U.S. 517, 527-35 (1994) (rejecting as inappropriate the application of the reen-
actment rule), with Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). And because of the
internal contradiction in the legislative history, it could be argued that the committee
report is of little help in interpreting the 1988 Act. Professor Burbank, who provided
assistance to (and, apparently, heavily influenced) the House Committee in the prep-
aration of its report, disagrees, arguing that the Senate report should be given little
weight, because "unlike both the 1985 and 1988 HouseJudiciary Committee reports,
which were available to members of the House (and Senate) prior to the sessions at
which action was taken, this analysis was first available to the members of the Senate
during the late evening session when the Senate bill was discussed and approved."
Burbank, supra note 4, at 1034-35 (citations omitted).
256 According to the canon of statutory construction, expressio unius, expression of
one thing suggests exclusion of others. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244 (1991); Chan v. Korean Airlines, 490 U.S. 122, 132-33 (1989). Professor Gilson
makes a similar point in the context of discussing the desirability of specific rules to
deter socially undesirable behavior: "The more specific the prohibition, the more
likely it is that undesirable conduct, which was intended to be prohibited and which
would have been covered by a more general prohibition, will not be barred." Ronald
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 883 (1981) (citations omitted).
257 H.R. No. REP. 99-422, at 22 (1985).
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may provide,258 for if commentators and the courts can agree on
nothing else, they can agree that the terms "substance" and "proce-
dure" have no plain meaning.
E. The Supreme Court Begins to Take "Substantive Rights"
Seriously-Post 1988
It is well-known that the Court has never found a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure invalid as beyond the scope of the Court's authority in
the Rules Enabling Act, although, beginning withJustice Frankfurter's
opinion in Sibbach, there have been vigorous dissents from opinions
adjudging challenged Rules valid. In several recent decisions, the
Court has given some indication that it is more willing to pay heed to
the limiting language of the Rules Enabling Act, if not to strike down
Rules, at least to read them in such a way that they do not run afoul of
the prohibition against Rules affecting substantive rights. For exam-
ple, in the 1990 decision in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,259 Justice
O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court on this point, stated that a
Rule must be interpreted "according to its plain meaning.., in light of
the scope of the congressional authorization [in the Rules Enabling Act]."
260
The Court, however, was not unanimous as to the scope of that au-
thority. Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's interpretation of
Rule 11261 as requiring the imposition of sanctions even after volun-
258 Justice Scalia has been critical of the use of legislative history in interpreting
statutes, preferring a "textualist" or "plain meaning" approach. Although a majority
of the Court has expressed its disagreement withJustice Scalia's rejection of legislative
history, see Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991), his
influence has led to decreased reliance by the Court on legislative history. See
Thomas Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351 (1994). But even justice Scalia has looked to legislative history in a difficult case.
See Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TowARD INsrrruIONAL CoMrny 174-75 (Robert A.
Katzmann ed., 1988) (quotingJustice Scalia as saying "I play the game like everybody
else... I'm in a system which has accepted rules and legislative history is used ....
You read my opinions, I sin with the rest of them"); see also Burbank, supra note 4.
For a discussion of the use of legislative history in the interpretation of statutes, and a
collection of citations to major articles on the debate, see WnLzIAM N. EsKRIDGEJR. &
Pinup P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PuBuc PoLIcY, Ch. 8, and 751 n.3 (2d ed. 1995).
259 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
260 Id. at 391 (emphasis added) (Justice Stevens dissented with respect to one part
of the opinion).
261 Rule 11 was amended in 1993, partly in response to, and in order to overturn,
the ruling in Cooter & GelL After 1993 Rule 11, sanctions are no longer mandatory,
Rule 11 (c), and monetary sanctions cannot be imposed on the court's initiative after
the case has been dismissed or settled. See Rule 11(c) (2) (B). In addition, by virtue of
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tary dismissal of a complaint finder Rule 41 (a) (1), on the ground that
"the Rules Enabling Act does not give us authority to create a genera-
lized federal common law of malicious prosecution divorced from
concerns with the efficient and just processing of cases in federal
court."
2 6 2
The next term, in Business Guides,2 6 3 the Court considered a
Rules Enabling Act challenge to the former Rule 11, but, adopting a
plain meaning analysis, held that the Rule mandated sanctions against
a represented party for failure to make a reasonable prefiling in-
quiry.2 64 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
265
dissented, arguing, among other things, that the Rule should be inter-
preted more narrowly, as the majority's interpretation would run
afoul of the proscription in the Rules Enabling Act against Rules that
affect substantive rights. "In the Rules Enabling Act," Justice Kennedy
noted:
Congress has delegated to the Court authority to prescribe "general
rules of practice and procedure" .. . which may not "abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right .... The grant of authority to
regulate procedure and the denial of authority to alter substantive
rights expresses proper concern for federalism and separation of
powers.... Congress desired the courts to regulate "practice and
procedure," an area where we have expertise and some degree of
inherent authority. But Congress wanted the definition of substan-
tive rights left to itself in cases where federal law applies, or to the
States where state substantive law governs.
266
To Justice Kennedy, "the majority's reading of Rule 11 raises
troubling concerns with respect to both separation of powers and fed-
eralism." The reading of Rule 11 was inconsistent with the allocation
of authority in the Rules Enabling Act, he argued. The "new duty
the "safe harbor" provision of 11 (c) (1) (A), no motion for sanctions under Rule 11
can be filed or presented to the court if a pleading is withdrawn within 21 days of the
service of a formal motion on the offending party. See generally Kelleher, supra note
48, at 70-76.
262 Cooter, 496 U.S. at 410, 412.
263 Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533
(1991). Professor Burbank has stated that the Business Guides case was the first time
since Sibbach that the Supreme Court was willing "to take at least somewhat seriously
an Enabling Act challenge to a Federal Rule . . . ." Burbank, supra note 64, at 843.
264 For an argument that the plain meaning approach to Rules interpretation is
.misguided, unwarranted, and inappropriate," see Moore, supra note 38, at 1085.
265 Justice Scalia also joined Justice Kennedy in dissenting from the majority opin-
ion, but did notjoin in that portion ofJustice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in which
he discussed the Rules Enabling Act.
266 Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 565.
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discovered by the majority in the text of the Rule," which required a
represented party to make reasonable inquiry prior to the commence-
ment of a lawsuit, "is one that should be created, if at all, by Con-
gress," not by the Court.267 Justice Kennedy pointed out that
Congress had provided for fee-shifting in various statutes, and that it
was not up to the Court to "invade the legislature's province by redis-
tributing litigation costs" 2 68 with a Rule permitting the imposition of
sanctions on a represented party. In addition to invading the prov-
ince of Congress, he continued, the majority's interpretation of the
Rule could be an incursion into matters reserved to the States, which
have tort law governing malicious prosecution or abuse of process,
thus raising once again a question as to the breadth of not just the
Court's, but also Congress' authority.
The approach of the dissenters in Cooter & Cell and Business
Guides was to look to the substantive rights limitation on the Court's
rulemaking authority as a rule of construction in determining the
scope, or application, of Federal Rules. That is, if a Rule can be read
narrowly so as not to affect substantive rights, it should be. Although
that approach had been disavowed explicitly by the Court as late as
1980 in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,269 the Court has now explicitly
adopted it. For the first time, in the 1991 decision in Kamen v. Kemper
Financial Services Inc.,2 70 a unanimous Court relied on the substantive
rights limitation as a guide in interpreting the scope of a Rule, and
cited the REA as a reason for giving a Rule a narrow reading. In that
case, the Court held that the Rules Enabling Act's prohibition against
Rules that affect substantive rights required a restrictive reading of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, governing shareholder deriva-
tive suits. At issue was whether the Rule created any particular de-
mand requirement to be applied in a derivative suit brought under a
federal statute, the Investment Company Act. The demand require-
ment, Justice Marshall wrote, is clearly a matter of "substance" and not
"procedure," as it delimits the respective powers of directors and
shareholders to control corporate litigation. Thus, Justice Marshall
held, the Rule does not-and could not-create any particular de-
mand requirement. "Indeed, as a rule of procedure issued pursuant
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 446 U.S. 740 (1980). The Court noted: "This is not to suggest that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a 'direct
collision' with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a
direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis devel-
oped in Hanna v. Plumer applies." Id. at 750 n.9.
270 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
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to the Rules Enabling Act, Rule 23.1 cannot be understood to
'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."' 271 Therefore, the
Court held, the dimensions of the demand requirement must be as-
certained by reference to the relevant substantive law, the Investment
Company Act, which, the Court held, incorporated the state law de-
mand requirement.
This approach was also followed by the Court in its most recent
pronouncements on the Rules Enabling Act. In the 1996 decision in
Gasperini,272 the Court rejected the argument that Rule 59 applied to
determine whether a jury verdict should be reviewed and a new trial
granted in a diversity case, noting that "[f]ederal courts have inter-
preted the Federal Rules ... with sensitivity to important state inter-
ests and regulatory policies."273 Again, in the Amchem decision last
term, the Court stated that Rule 23 must be read in light of the REA's
"substantive rights" limitation.274
IV. THE PROPOSED TEST
The Court has provided little guidance for determining when a
Rule has impermissibly affected substantive rights in violation of the
REA, and its decisions on the issue are muddled. Recently, however,
the Court seems to have signaled that it is more willing to take the
substantive rights limitation of the REA more seriously, and to use it as
a rule of construction in reading Rules so as to avoid invalidity. By
doing so, the Court is moving in the right direction, but what is still
needed is an explicit, coherent, and workable test that may be applied
both by the rulemakers and the courts. In this Part, the Article sets
out a number of factors that should be considered in determining the
validity, or applicability, of a Rule. In doing so, it is important to keep
in mind that we are dealing with the question of congressional in-
tent-not just in the Rules Enabling Act, but in the entire body of
statutes concerning procedure. What authority does Congress intend
to delegate to the Court, and what powers does it intend to reserve for
itself?275 In determining the scope of delegation intended by Con-
271 Id at 96.
272 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
273 Id. at 428 n.7. See also id. at 441 n.1 ("[T]here is no conceivable conflict be-
tween Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and the application of the New York dam-
ages limit .... ) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2244 (1997).
275 Congressional intent is, of course, a fiction. A diverse body such as Congress
cannot be said to have a single intent; each member may have his or her own motiva-
tion for acting. But the concept of a legislature's institutional intent is commonly
understood (although hotly debated), and it is in that sense that it is used in this
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gress under the REA, it is important to read the REA in light of other
procedural statutes, and in light of sensitive separation of powers and
federalism concerns. The phrase "substantive rights," as used in the
REA, does not have the same meaning as in other areas of legal dis-
course. Some matters that in ordinary legal parlance are considered
"procedural," such as venue or subject matter jurisdiction, are "sub-
stantive" for purposes of the REA. In determining the scope or valid-
ity of a Rule under the "substantive rights" limitation, this Article
proposes the following factors should be considered, with no single
factor determinative in all situations.
A. The Extent to Which Congress Has Regulated the Area
One important factor to consider is the extent to which Congress
has legislated in a particular procedural area.276 The scope of author-
ity delegated to the Court may shift over time, as Congress enacts new
procedural regulation and leaves fewer matters to the Court. In this
respect, the detail, length of time, and scope of the congressional reg-
ulation is relevant. Detailed, long-standing congressional enactments
in an area are a strong indication that Congress believes that the mat-
ter requires consideration of policies beyond the business of the
courts and should be regulated by Congress. For example, venue gen-
erally is considered a matter of procedure. But, from the FirstJudici-
ary Act to the present time, Congress has regulated venue in federal
courts,2 77 providing a powerful indication that it has decided to re-
move authority over venue from the federal courts and to regulate the
area directly itself.
Venue also is a good example of an area in which Congress has
"occupied the field" completely. There is statutory provision for the
appropriate venue of each case that may be commenced in a federal
court,2 78 a strong indication that it intended to exclude judicial
rulemaking in the area. By contrast, the provisions in the PSLRA pro-
viding for a heightened pleading requirement in securities litigation
are limited to a specific type of case, and while they preclude the oper-
Article. For an overview of some of the extensive commentary on the concept of
legislative intent, see generally ESKRIDGE & F icKEY supra note 258, at 84-87; 524-31;
733-832.
276 See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters. Inc., 498
U.S. 533 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
277 See Whitten, supra note 70, at 56-57.
278 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides a general venue rule. In addition, there are special
venue provisions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1396 (internal revenue tax cases); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1397 (interpleader); 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (stockholders' derivative action suits); 28
U.S.C. § 1400 (patent and copyright cases).
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ation of court-promulgated pleading Rules in securities cases,279 they
do not indicate a congressional desire to preclude the Court from
promulgating general Rules governing pleading requirements in
other cases.
As a corollary, a decision by Congress not to regulate a particular
procedural area at all, even in the face of political pressure to do so,
may be taken as an indicator that Congress has decided the area is
more appropriately regulated by Rules promulgated by the Court.
Thus, for example, the refusal of Congress to enact legislation repeal-
ing the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Rules could be
viewed as an indication that Congress prefers the area of discovery
and disclosure to be regulated by Court-promulgated Rules, and has
concluded that the matter is not one that touches on substantive
rights within the meaning of the REA. 280 In the case of the provisions
279 A subsequently-promulgated Rule will not supersede the PSLRA, despite the
supercession clause, as any rule purporting to govern pleading requirements in secur-
ities cases would impermissibly affect what Congress has clearly indicated to be a sub-
stantive right and thus not be a valid Rule.
280 Professor Landers has suggested that the test for whether a matter involves a
substantive right is whether it is "the subject of widespread public controversy, as dif-
ferentiated from controversy among lawyers." Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized
Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma,
47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 857 (1974). Professor Carrington makes a similar argument.
In commenting on extant proposals to amend Rule 23(b) (4) to permit certification
of classes for settlement purposes only, he commented:
Proposed paragraph (b) (4) is politically controversial, supported by some
factions and opposed by others. That is solid proof of its substantivity in the
pragmatic sense. When large political forces are marshaled in support of or
in opposition to a proposed amendment to a rule ... [it generally is] be-
cause the proposal has important effects extrinsic to the process by which
the courts decide cases or controversies in accordance with the law.
Carrington & Apanovich., supra note 4, at 482-83. In the next paragraph, however,
he states that even though the 1993 revisions to Rules 30 and 26 were opposed by
court reporters and the bar, respectively, "those reforms were incontestably proce-
dural in character, having no effect on right or duties bearing on relations and events
outside federal judicial proceedings." Id. Thus, his "politically controversial" test has
no meaning, for, under the test, a matter is substantive when it is the subject of polit-
ical controversy, unless, it is not.
Professor Goldberg has criticized the "widespread controversy" test for causing
the meaning of substantive rights, and the permissibility of a particular rule, to vary
over time as public attention is focused on the issue. See Goldberg, supra note 163, at
437 n.244. While it may not be desirable to have the meaning of substantive rights
vary over time, that will necessarily be the effect of increasing Congressional regula-
tion in areas that were previously seen as procedural. But the relevant intent is that of
Congress, not lobbyists. Thus, if Congress chooses to leave discovery issues to the
Court, the extent to which interest groups lobby for congressional regulation is irrele-
vant. Certain matters, like discovery, are obviously and presumptively procedural, and
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on mandatory disclosure requirements, Congress' failure to act ap-
pears not to be so much a conscious decision to leave the matter to
Court-promulgated Rules as an inability of the members of Congress
to agree on an alternative to Rules with which most members of Con-
gress disagree.28' Nonetheless, discovery is a matter so important to
the functioning of the courts and the control of litigation before them
that it is obviously and presumptively procedural (discussed at pages
169-70 below), so that the failure of Congress to act, regardless of the
reason, could be considered to have as its necessary consequence the
allocation of authority over the matter to the Court. This is not to
suggest that any matter on which Congress does not regulate always is
appropriately dealt with by the Rules, or that any Rule dealing with
the matter is permissible. In the example of mandatory disclosure re-
quirements, the Rules permit district courts to "opt-out" of those re-
quirements, 282 and, as discussed below, the lack of trans-substantivity
is a factor that would tend toward a finding of invalidity.
On a related point, a decision by Congress to enact a procedural
provision as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Federal
Rules of Evidence should not be taken as an indication of congres-
sional intent to remove the area from regulation by the Court.
Rather, Congress' placing the statutory provision in the Rules should
be taken as an indication that it considers the matter one of proce-
dure and intends the provision to be subject to amendment by the
Rules Enabling Act process, pursuant to the supersession clause, un-
less Congress indicates to the contrary. One example of an indication
to the contrary is in 2074(b), 283 in which Congress has provided that
any Rules purporting to affect evidentiary privilege must be approved
by Congress. This provision makes it clear that the placement of con-
gressional statutes governing privilege in the Rules of Evidence should
not be considered evidence that such matters are procedural and sub-
ject to regulation pursuant to the REA Rules amendment process.
While the failure to enact a procedural provision of part of the Rules
is not determinative of whether the matter is substantive, it is a factor
that should be considered.
within the delegation of the REA, unless Congress removes them from the Court's
authority.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
282 Recently proposed amendments would eliminate most of the authorizations
for local deviations from the 1993 scheme of disclosure and discovery. See, e.g., Pro-
posed Amendments to Rule 26(a) (1), (d), (f), available at <http:www.uscourts.gov>.
283 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1994) ("Any... rule creating, abolishing, or modifying
an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of
Congress.").
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Before moving on to the next factor, Professor Whitten's contri-
bution to the analysis of this first factor deserves acknowledgement,
but his reasoning was quite different. Professor Whitten suggested
that the degree of congressional regulation in a particular procedural
area is a factor to be considered in determining whether a Rule
promulgated by the Court in that area violates separation of powers
restrictions on rulemaking.28 4 The better approach, however, is to
look to the degree of regulation by Congress as a factor in determin-
ing the scope of authority delegated to the Court, and thus not reach
the constitutional issue. We have seen that there is no separation of
powers limitations on Congress' delegating authority to the Court to
regulate most procedural matters. The REA is an expression of a gen-
eral congressional intent to delegate to the Court authority to regu-
late procedural matters, provided they do not impermissibly affect
substantive rights. Extensive congressional regulation of a procedural
matter should be taken as an indication of a specific congressional
intent to remove that matter from the area subject to regulation by
the Court. To put it another way, congressional regulation is evidence
of Congress' determination that the particular matter is more prop-
erly characterized as one involving a substantive right. By viewing the
significance of congressional legislation in this way, the issue of the
constitutional infirmity of the delegation under the REA need not be
confronted.2 8 5 If at all possible, the REA should be read so as to be
constitutional, rather than as an attempt by Congress to make an un-
constitutional delegation of power.28 6 In that way, a potential Article
I problem with the supersession clause also is averted. When Con-
gress has regulated in a procedural area, such as the PSLRA provision
on pleading, there is a strong presumption that Congress has ex-
pressed a substantive policy and has removed from the Court author-
ity to promulgate a Rule governing pleading in securities cases. Thus,
a subsequently promulgated Rule should be read narrowly, if at all
possible, as not applying to cases governed by the PSLRA. If the Rule
284 See Whitten, supra note 70.
285 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-49 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring). See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Ques-
tions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994).
286 See, e.g., United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843, 868 (1996) ("In interpreting stat-
utes . .. we have long observed '[t]he elementary rule . . . that every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality
. ... ' This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues
not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is
bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The Courts will therefore
not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liber-
ties or usurp powers constitutionally forbidden it.") (citations omitted).
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did purport to govern the matter regulated by Congress, it would not
be valid and could not supersede the congressional enactment.
B. Impact of the Rule on Congressional Policy
A related consideration is the extent to which a Court-promul-
gated Rule would interfere with congressional policy. Congress has
power to regulate procedure, and in doing so may override federal
procedural common law, as well as any Rule promulgated by the
Court pursuant to authority delegated by Congress. A Rule that con-
flicts with Congress' expressed legislative policy is invalid, as it has
crossed the line into "substantive rights," as that phrase is used by
Congress in the REA. Thus, the Court could not promulgate new
pleading Rules inconsistent with the pleading requirements in the
PSLRA, as Congress therein expressed its policy choices between the
competing interests of the divergent parties in cases governed by that
Act. General pleading Rules, however, could still be promulgated to
govern all other cases as to which Congress has not made a similar
policy determination, as there is no interference with congressional
policy in those cases.
In this regard, only congressional policy, and not state legislative
policy, is significant. The extent to which a Federal Rule interferes
with a particular state's legislative policy is relevant only to the extent
that it impacts on preemption analysis (as discussed below, in Part IV
C). The appropriate inquiry is not whether the particular state's law
that is being displaced has a substantive purpose. The validity of a
Federal Rule cannot vary from state to state. Whether the matter is
one involving a substantive right is an issue of federal law-the mean-
ing of the REA.28 7 Expressed state legislative policy, however, may in-
fluence the determination of whether a matter is one traditionally in
the domain of the states, which itself is an indicator that Congress
considers it a matter implicating substantive rights, and affects the de-
termination as to the preemptive effect Congress intended for a Rule
on the matter. And expressed state legislative policy may, as a practi-
cal matter, act as a "red flag" to alert the Court to the necessity of
proceeding cautiously, with due regard to issues of comity and federal-
ism 28 8 and "with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory
287 Cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (finding that whether a
statute of limitations was deemed "procedural" or "substantive" by state courts was
irrelevant to the determination of whether a federal court was required to apply it
under the Erie doctrine, as that determination was made as a matter of federal law).
288 Cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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policies" 289 in interpreting the scope and applicability of the Federal
Rules.
C. Whether the Matter is One Traditionally in the Domain of the States
We have seen that Congress can, if it wishes to do so, use its
power to regulate procedure in federal courts to displace substantive
state law, subject to the ambiguous limits imposed by the federal struc-
ture. 290 We have seen also that the courts' ability to displace state law,
in the absence of congressional or constitutional directive, is more
limited than Congress', as a function of the constitutional structure.
There are matters as to which a federal procedural common law rule
will not displace state law, but the same rule articulated by Congress
will. An example is choice of law in diversity cases. In Klaxon,2 91 the
Court established that federal courts may not, as a matter of proce-
dural common law, fashion their own choice of law rules in diversity
cases, but must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Yet
there is no serious doubt that Congress could, pursuant to its Article
III power to regulate procedure in federal courts, enact choice of law
rules for federal courts in diversity cases.
292
As demonstrated by the Arbitration Act and the Rules of Evi-
dence, however, Congress generally has been careful to avoid displac-
ing state law with procedural enactments and has avoided delegating
preemption authority to the Court. Under general preemption analy-
sis, if a federal law concerns an area that traditionally has been the
domain of the states, regulated by substantive state law, the federal law
is less likely to be found to have a preemptive effect than a law in an
area traditionally left to Congress. This presumption against preemp-
tion effectively operates to ensure that Congress carefully has weighed
the concerns of the states, and considered the limits imposed on its
powers by the federal system, in making its determination as to the
scope of the federal law. There should be a similar presumption with
respect to the authority delegated by Congress to the Court to make
Federal Rules. In determining the scope of authority delegated to the
Court under the REA, we are determining the preemptive effect Con-
gress intended the Rules to have. In areas traditionally regulated by
the states, it is unlikely that Congress intended Rules to have preemp-
289 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 n.7 (1996).
290 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
291 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
292 See generally HART & WESCHLER, supra note 99, at 696-703 (arguing also, inter
alia, that the result in Klaxon is not constitutionally mandated, and that the Court in
Klaxon could have applied a federal choice of law rule).
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tive force. 293 Just as congressional enactments should be read care-
fully to avoid unintended preemption of state law, the REA should be
read narrowly to avoid unintended delegation of authority to displace
state law. Rather, it should be presumed that Congress intended to
reserve for itself the choice whether to preempt state law in the area
with prospective federal regulation. As Professor Mishkin has argued,
Congress, and not the Court, is constitutionally structured to weigh
state interests in determining whether it may, and should, preempt
state laws.
294
The congressional intent to have a uniform set of federal proce-
dural Rules is strong evidence that federal procedural common law
may be overridden by Rules, 295 but it should not be considered suffi-
cient evidence of intent to delegate to the Court authority to make the
decision whether to preempt state law in a specific area.29 6 The above
discussion should not be taken as suggesting that the line between
"substance" and "procedure" will vary between diversity cases and fed-
eral question cases. Rather, as the point was made by the Court in
Gasperini, the REA's substantive rights limitation effectively operates as
a rule of construction, and the Rules should be read "with sensitivity
to important state interests and regulatory policies." 297 Thus, in
Kamen, the Court appropriately declined to find that Federal Rule
23.1 governed the demand requirement in derivative suits, as that is a
matter of internal corporate governance which traditionally has been
in the domain of the states.2 98
D. The Trans-Substantive Nature of the Rule
When Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act, it expressed its
desire that there be a uniform set of federal procedural Rules that
293 Cf Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
294 See Mishkin, supra note 111, at 1685.
295 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
296 In this respect, the Court errs in giving the desire for uniformity a determina-
tive effect in the Sibbach and Burlington cases. See supra text accompanying notes
212-19 and 226-27.
297 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 n.7 (1996) (citing
Walker).
298 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (reaching this result even
though the complaint was a derivative suit under the Federal Investment Company
Act). In an earlier case, the Court left open the issue of whether the contemporane-
ous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1 can preempt a contrary state rule. See Ban-
gor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 708 n.4
(1974); see also Paul P. Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Oumership Rule in Shareholders'
Derivative Suits, 25 U.C.LA. L. R v. 1041 (1978).
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would be as neutral as possible.299 That neutrality was to be reflected
in trans-substantive Rules.300 As Professor Carrington has noted,
"generalism in procedure is linked to the aim of avoiding 'interest
group' politics."301 While there is an ongoing debate as to the practi-
cality of trans-substantive rules, whether trans-substantive rules can be
accurately said to be neutral, and as to whether it is even possible to
actually achieve a politically neutral procedural system,30 2 there is
strong support for the argument that Congress intended to achieve
the goal of neutrality, insofar as is possible, with the system established
under the REA. Professor Carrington has argued that "given the uni-
versal relief which had just come with the abolition of the common
law forms of action, and in the merger of law and equity," the delega-
tion of authority to the Supreme Court to promulgate "general" Rules
"should be presumed to mean that rules.., should not be limited in
their application either to a particular geographic area or to a particu-
lar subject matter of dispute." 30 3 Similarly, Professor Subrin points
out that at the time that the REA was enacted, many in the American
public and in Congress were distrustful of the conservative Supreme
Court, which was perceived as standing in the way of social legislation.
In such a political climate, it would have been difficult to persuade
Congress to confer on the Court a power to promulgate procedural
rules that were not trans-substantive, because of the potential that they
could be manipulated to favor particular interests. The desire for uni-
form Federal Rules, he argues, encompassed a desire for trans-sub-
stantive uniformity.30 4 Thus, a Rule that is not trans-substantive, such
as the substance-specific local discovery rules permitted by the opt-out
provisions of Rule 26, will face a strong, though rebuttable, argument
for a presumption of invalidity. Similarly, Rules that apply only to spe-
cific kinds of actions, such as Rule 23.1, which concerns only deriva-
299 See Pound, supra note 31.
300 The term "trans-substantive" appears to have been coined in Robert M. Cover,
ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718, 732-40
(1975) (discussing the pros and cons of a single set of rules to govern all kinds of
proceedings).
301 Carrington, supra note 177, at 303.
302 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 29; Judith Resnik, The Domain of the Courts, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 2219 (1989).
303 Carrington, supra note 29, at 2079; see also Carrington, supra note 177, at
303-04 ("The costs of the differentiated procedure of England were well known to
those who drafted the Rules Enabling Act and the 1938 Rules."). But see Burbank,
supra note 4, at 1041 (arguing that there is no evidence in the legislative history to
support Carrington's contention).
304 See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Di-
vergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2005-06 (1989).
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five suits, are suspect, as they provide greater procedural protections
to one class of litigants to the exclusion, and at the expense, of others.
E. The Implication of Policies Extrinsic to the Business of the Courts
Another important factor in determining whether a Rule imper-
missibly affects a substantive right is, in the words of the 1985 Commit-
tee Report, whether the lawmaking choice in the Rules "necessarily
and obviously require Es] consideration of policies extrinsic to the
business of the courts. '30 5 All procedural rules have some impact on
substantive rights, in the sense that procedure will determine the man-
ner in which substantive rights are determined in court. The Court
has held that some incidental impact of Federal Rules on substantive
rights is permitted,30 6 although it has never made clear how great the
impact must be before it ceases to be merely incidental.30 7 At some
point, however, the impact of a Rule on substantive rights will be too
great, and it will cross the line into impermissibly "modify[ing],
abridg[ing] or enlarg[ing] substantive rights.1308
Rules affecting limitations periods, for example, which have an
admittedly procedural goal in ensuring accuracy of evidence, also
have the substantive goal of providing potential defendants with a
sense of repose and of providing a temporal limit on the parties'
rights. The legislative history of the 1988 Rules Enabling Act makes
clear that the substantive implications of limitations periods are suffi-
ciently significant that they place such matters beyond the scope of
the Court's authority under the REA.30° If Rule 3 were read as tolling
limitations periods, it would be invalid under this standard. Thus, cor-
305 H.R. REP. No. 99422, at 22 (1985).
306 See Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
307 The Court can be faulted, also, for stretching the concept of "incidental" im-
pact so far as to render it a meaningless limit, in the Sibbach and Burlington cases. See
supra text accompanying notes 212-19 and 226-27.
308 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
309 See H.R. REP No. 99422 at 21 ("IT]he bill does not confer power on the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and preclu-
sion, that necessarily and obviously define or limit rights under substantive law."); see
also Burbank, supra note 4, at 1033; accord Rowe, supra note 4 at 980-81. Indeed, for
similar reasons, such matters may be beyond the scope of Congressional authority to
regulate pursuant to its Article III power. Matters such as statutes of limitations may
be too substantive to be preempted by Congress in diversity matters pursuant to a
purely procedural statute. See supra text accompanying notes 137-51; see also Car-
rington, supra note 4, at 483; 19 WIucGHT ET A.., supra note 72, § 4509, n.17, at 266
(expressing doubt as to the extent of Congressional power to determine limitations
periods in diversity actions).
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rectly, the Court has refused to read the Rule in that manner.3 10 Rule
4, on the other hand, governing service, may under some circum-
stances have an indirect impact on limitations periods, as in the
Hanna case. Such an incidental impact, which is not the obvious pur-
pose or result of the Rule, is permissible.
3 1 1
As discussed above, congressional regulation in a procedural area
is a strong indicator that Congress considers lawmaking choices in the
area to require consideration of policy issues beyond the business of
the courts. Regulation by state legislatures is also relevant, but not, as
has been argued by Professor Ely, because it is important to determine
whether the particular state legislation at issue in a particular case has
a substantive, as opposed to a procedural, purpose.312 Rather, as dis-
cussed above, it is relevant to the determination of whether the matter
310 See Regan v. Merchant Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Walker
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-51 (1980). Rule 15(c), permitting the rela-
tion back of amendments to complaints, does impact on limitations periods and, for
that reason, its validity has been questioned by several commentators. See, e.g., Bur-
bank, supra note 4; C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 287 n.102. But see 19 WRIGHT ET AL., Supra
note 72, at 272-77 (concluding that Rule 15(c) is valid because its impact on the
substantive rights protected by state limitations periods is relatively minor, and be-
cause Rule 15(c) is a significant part of a comprehensive, uniform and rational system
of federal procedure.). Cf Rowe, supra note 4, at 1016:
The conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (c) on relation back
and a more liberal state provision that led to the First Circuit's decision in
Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974), to regard the state rule as
substantive and follow it, has been eliminated by the 1991 amendment per-
mitting relation back when it is permitted by the law that provides the statute
of limitations applicable to the action.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1).
Professor Rowe, however, ignores the conflict that arises when the federal rule is
more lenient than the state rule in permitting relation back.
311 See Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946); cf. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965).
312 Professor Ely argues that where state legislation has been enacted for one or
more nonprocedural purposes, that is, for some purpose not having to do with the
fairness or efficiency of the litigation process, it grants a substantive right within the
meaning of the Rules Enabling Act, and cannot be overridden by a Federal Rule. See
Ely, supra note 1, at 724-25 (citation omitted). Several other commentators have
argued that a Federal Rule cannot supplant a "substantive" state law. See, e.g., Whit-
ten, supra note 194; see also Rowe, supra note 4. This approach is criticized by Profes-
sor Burbank as
confining the Act to the protection of existing policy choices and, more im-
portantly, to the protection of state law. It presents the additional problem
of engaging the federal courts in the difficult and highly manipulable busi-
ness of ascertaining the policies animating particular rules of state law ....
Burbank, supra note 4, at 1017-18 (1989) (citations omitted).
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is one traditionally in the domain of the states, which affects the deter-
mination of what preemptive intent Congress should be deemed to
have intended for the Rules on the matter. The determination of
what authority was delegated to the Court, and thus whether a Rule
should be read narrowly, or is invalid, should not, and does not, de-
pend on the law of the forum state in which the issue is raised. The
relevant inquiry is the extent to which all of the states traditionally
have regulated the area, not just the regulation in the forum state.
Another strong indicator that policies extrinsic to the business of
the courts necessarily are implicated is that a Rule concerns a matter
within the penumbra of matters governed by the federal Constitu-
tion.31 3 Congress should not be presumed to have delegated to the
Court authority to promulgate Rules on matters such as the allocation
of functions between judge and jury, which is a matter "influenced,"
although not necessarily governed, by the constitutional provision for
jury trials.3 14 In such areas, although Congress has reserved for itself
the authority to make prospective rules, and overridden any inherent
prospective rulemaking authority the Court may have had, the federal
interest may still be sufficiently great to permit a displacement of state
law through the Court's inherent procedural common law-making au-
thority, as in the Byrd case, subject to control of Congress.315
A determination of whether a Rule necessarily implicates a con-
sideration of policies beyond the business of the Court does not de-
pend on the articulated policy behind the Rule, as evidenced by
Committee notes. If the Committee notes reflect a substantive policy,
it will be strong evidence that the Rule is one beyond the authority of
313 Cf. Burbank, supra note 32, at 1169 ("The concern for substantive rights ex-
pressed in the Act... apparently extends to constitutional interests that are proce-
dural in the sense that they are implicated only in the context of litigation."). He
suggests, however, that only those interests specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, such as the right to ajury, are constitutional interests relevant under the Act, so
that the "entire [rulemaking] enterprise will not founder in the lap of the due process
clause." Id. at 1171. The extent to which matters that implicate due process concerns
will be taken up in a subsequent article concerning the validity of Rule 4.
314 Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (allocation of
function between judge and jury is "influenced, if not controlled by Seventh amend-
ment"). In Byrd, the Court did not decide whether the Constitution dictated the re-
sult, but proceeded as though the allocation of functions between judge and jury was
a matter of procedural common law. Out of concern that the 1963 amendments to
Rule 50 encroached on the right to trial by jury, and were too substantive to be
promulgated by the Court, Justices Black and Douglas dissented from their transmis-
sion to Congress. See Order of January 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865 (Black & Douglas,.JJ.,
dissenting).
315 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1975).
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the Court. But even if an admittedly procedural policy is the only
professed rationale for a Rule, the notes will not be determinative on
the issue.3
16
F. The Importance of the Matter to the Orderly Functioning of the Courts
Another important consideration is the extent to which the pro-
cedural matter is central to the orderly functioning of the courts.
Here, the relevant inquiry is whether the issue is one that has tradi-
tionally been in the domain of the courts, as opposed to a matter that
Congress, or the state legislatures, traditionally have regulated. The
extent to which a court would find it necessary to regulate the matter
in the absence of legislative or constitutional guidance is important.
If a court would find it necessary to determine an issue in order to
function efficiently, the matter appears more procedural, and appro-
priately subject to regulation by court rule. An example is pleading.
As discussed earlier, pleading rules can have a significant impact on
substantive rights. Nonetheless, in the absence of any prospective
rules, a court would find it necessary to determine whether a com-
plaint was in proper form, provided sufficient notice of the action,
and justified a hearing on the merits. A court also would find it neces-
sary to determine which pleadings were permitted. Furthermore,
pleading requirements have traditionally been relegated to the judici-
ary. Under the Conformity Act, the federal courts were to follow
pleading rules applicable in the forum state's courts. The centrality of
pleading rules to the functioning of the courts was recognized in the
original Rules Enabling Act, which specifically mentioned pleadings
in the delegation of authority to the Court.317 Given the centrality of
pleading requirements to the effective functioning of the courts, con-
gressional regulation of pleading in a specific case, such as the statu-
tory pleading rule for securities cases in the PSLRA, should not be
considered an indication that Congress has determined pleading rules
generally to be substantive, and beyond the reach of the Court. The
general pleading rules are required to fill the interstices.
By contrast, rules governing limitations periods are less central to
the functioning of the court. In the absence of any prospective rule
316 The Committee, of course, has an interest in having Rules upheld as valid, so a
statement by the Committee as to the impact of the Rule will not be determinative.
Cf Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin of American Law: Committee Notes, Comments
and Commentay, 29 GA. L. REV. 993 (1995) (arguing that Committee notes generally
should be given little weight in interpreting Federal Rules).
317 See Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, Stat. 1064 (1988) (reproduced at
supra note 179).
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limiting actions, a court can function quite well.318 Although limita-
tions periods have procedural purposes, in that they do permit a court
to operate more efficiently by clearing the docket, they are not central
to the functioning of the courts.319 Congressional regulation of these
procedural matters, even though not complete, is strong evidence that
Congress does not intend the Court to regulate limitations periods by
the Rules.3 20
The list of relevant factors presented above is not intended to be
an exhaustive list. Rather, the list is proffered as a starting point for a
more reasoned analysis of congressional intent in the delegation of
authority under the Rules Enabling Act and the validity of Rules
promulgated pursuant to that authority. Analysis of particular Rules
may make it apparent that other factors should also be considered.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has not been to debate the appropri-
ate allocation of authority to regulate procedure in federal courts.
Rather, the Article examines the allocation that now exists, both at the
constitutional level and under the governing statute, the Rules En-
abling Act, considered in the context of the entire body of procedural
statutes. The delegation of authority to the Court under the Act has
for decades been a source of debate, and confusion, among commen-
tators and the courts. This Article attempts to set out a workable test
for adjudging the validity of, or determining the permissible scope of,
Rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act process. Potentially
problematic Rules include Rule 4, which concerns not only service but
amenability to jurisdiction; Rule 26(a), which, as of this writing, per-
mits district courts to opt out of mandatory disclosure requirements
for all or particular types of cases; Rule 23.1, governing derivative
suits; Rule 15 (c), which permits relation back of amended pleadings;
and Rule 23, governing class actions. Further research and analysis
remains to be done in order to apply the proposed test to these and
other Rules.
318 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1994) (no limitations on prosecutions for capital
offenses).
319 This is not to say that the courts do not have inherent authority over limita-
tions periods, in the absence of any congressional guidance. Indeed, the doctrine of
laches in equity cases ivas an exercise of the court's inherent authority in the area.
The federal interest is not sufficiently strong, however, to permit the federal judge-
made law to override state law of limitations. Cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945).
320 See H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 22 (1985)
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